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I. Introduction 
"1Wo roads diverged in a wood, and I-
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference. n 
-Robert Frosf 
5 
Lawyers seeking constitutional protection for reproductive 
rights have relied almost exclusively on a liberty/privacy theory under 
the Federal Constitution. In the wake of Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,2 this theory may be seen as 
providing a floor of minimum protection-preventing states from 
banning abortion outright. But it is not strong enough to prevent 
states from enacting restrictions on the availability of abortion. Thus, 
the battle over reproductive rights may be seen as shifting from one 
phase ("Can abortion be banned?") to another ("How far can states 
go in restricting access to abortion'?"). If proponents of reproductive 
freedom are to have any success in this second phase of abortion 
litigation, they must look beyond the lone theory that has so long 
sustained them. They must advance new theories under the Federal 
Constitution3-and they must also look to state constitutions. Except 
I Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 
295 (Angela Partington, ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
2 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
3 If women are ever to become equal partners in our society, they must be granted 
full control over the very thing that makes them "different" -their capacity to reproduce. 
This is the essence of an equal protection argument that has yet to be advanced before 
the U.S. Supreme Court. My equal protection analysis, while directed primarily at state 
constitutional claims, is applicable in part to claims under the Federal Constitution. See 
infra notes 238-60 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court has never 
decided this issue, at least two of its members may be receptive to such an argument. 
Justice Harry Black.mun, in dictum, has recognized that restrictions on abortion raise 
equal protection implications. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (Black.mun, J., concurring 
in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, before her appointment to the federal bench, fought for gender equality in a 
series of cases that reached the U.S. Supreme Court. She filed an influential amicus 
brief for the American Civil Liberties Union in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), 
the landmark decision in which the High Court first established "middle tier" or 
"heightened" scrutiny for gender-based discrimination. Two justices do not comprise 
a majority, of course, but their presence on the Court guarantees that such an argument 
will not fall upon deaf ears. 
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for a line of cases involving public funding of abortion,4 state 
constitutions have, until now, been utterly neglected.5 
This article will explore the use of state constitutions as an 
alternative or supplemental source of protection for reproductive 
4 Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981) 
(invoking the California Constitution's express right to privacy); Doe v. Maher, 515 
A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. 1986) (invoking the equal protection and liberty provisions of 
the Connecticut Constitution); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (invoking the 
Florida Constitution's express privacy guarantee); Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 417 
N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1'981) (recognizing an implied right to privacy in the substantive due 
process guarantees of the Massachusetts Constitution); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 
A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982) (recognizing an implied right to privacy in the New Jersey 
Constitution's liberty guarantee, and in the state equal protection clause); Hope v. 
Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1991) (invoking both the liberty and equal 
protection provisions of the New York Constitution}, ajf'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. 
Div. 1993); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Department of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 
1247 (Or. 1983) (invoking the privileges and immunities clause of the Oregon 
Constitution); Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Panepinto, 1993 W. Va. LEXIS 228 
(W.Va. Dec. 17, 1993) (invoking the equal protection and substantive due process 
guarantees of the West Virginia Constitution). A similar lawsuit was recently filed in 
Florida, Doe v. State, No. CL-93-2022-AJ (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (complaint filed March 1993) 
(invoking the state's express guarantees of privacy and equal protection in challenging 
a scheme that denies state Medicaid coverage for medically necessary abortions but funds 
childbirth expenses). But see Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 
(Pa. 1985) (rejecting state equal protection and state equal rights amendment theories). 
'American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989) (striking down a parental consent statute as violating the California 
Constitution's express privacy guarantee); Pretenn Cleveland v. Voinovich, 1992 Ohio 
Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 27, 1992) (striking down a mandatory 24 hour delay 
and biased counseling provisions under liberty, equal protection, free speech, and 
freedom of conscience provisions in the Ohio Constitution}, rev'd, 627 N.E.2d 570, 
dismissed, 624 N.E.2d 194, reh 'g denied, 626 N.E.2d 693; Planned Parenthood Ass'n 
v. McWherter, No. 92C-1672 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 1992) (recognizing a right of 
"procreational autonomy" under the Tennessee Constitution and, based on that right, 
striking down a mandatory 72 hour delay on abortions for adult women; striking down 
a residency requirement under the state equal protection clause). But see Jane L. v. 
Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1992) (rejecting state equal protection, freedom-
of-religion, and establishment-of-religion claims in a challenge to abortion access 
restrictions). These cases represent the first instances, outside the context of abortion 
funding disputes, in which state constitutional provisions have been successfully invoked 
to vindicate reproductive rights. As recently as 1991, lawyers were relying exclusively 
on the Federal Constitution in challenging abortion regulations. See, e.g., Fargo 
Women's Health Org. v. Sinner, 819 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.D. 1993) (challenging biased 
"informed consent" requirements and a mandatory 24 hour delay). In the wake of 
Casey, such exclusive reliance on the Federal Constitution is no longer tenable. 
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rights. I will begin by demonstrating that state courts are free to find 
in their own constitutions a greater degree of protection for individual 
liberty than that found by federal courts in the United States 
Constitution. 6 I will then furnish a sketch of post-Casey America: 
fifty separate battlegrounds in which anti-choice legislators will test 
the limits of Casey's "undue burden" standard by proposing ever 
more stringent obstacles to abortion. 7 Next, I will examine how a 
state constitution might be employed in challenging abortion 
regulations of the sort already upheld under the Federal Constitution. 8 
Focusing on the example of a single state-Ohio-I will show how 
the unique history and text of a state constitution which may be 
employed to differentiate its protections from those afforded by the 
federal charter. 9 Finally, I will show that state constitutions not only 
contain federal analogues (e.g., liberty, privacy, and equal protection 
guarantees) of independent force, 10 but also feature provisions with 
no federal counterpart (e.g., "freedom of conscience" guarantees) that 
may be applicable to abortion regulations. 11 
II. State Courts Are Free to Find in Their Own Constitutions a 
Greater Degree of Protection for Individual Liberty Than That 
Found by Federal Courts in the U.S. Constitution 
A. Historical Perspective 
In the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court became the 
nation's pre-eminent guardian of civil liberties by applying the Bill of 
Rights to the states. 12 But, as former Justice William Brennan 
admonished, "[t]he legal revolution which has brought federal law to 
the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective 
6 See infra notes 12-75 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 76-124 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 125-324 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 128-38 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 159-309 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 310-324 and accompanying text. 
12 Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pittler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: 
Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 636 (1987). 
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force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties 
cannot be guaranteed. "13 
After all, "the states pioneered the process of declaring 
fundamental rights. "14 America's first declarations of rights were 
penned by states,15 and the "[f]ramers of the various state 
constitutions intended their charters as the primary devices to protect 
individual rights. "16 In fact, the Federal Bill of Rights was modeled 
after provisions in state constitutions. 17 The states "demanded and 
secured the [Federal] Bill of Rights as a price for ratifying the 
Constitution." 18 Moreover, at its inception, the Federal Bill of Rights 
"was perceived as a secondary layer of protection, applying only 
against the federal government." 19 By contrast, state constitutions 
"were conceived as the first and at one time the only line of 
protection of the individual against the excess of local officials. "20 
Thus, state constitutions, construed by state courts, emerged as the 
"primary defenders of civil liberties and of equal rights. "21 
But when the Supreme Court "federalized" civil liberties 
jurisprudence by selectively incorporating the Bill of Rights into the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the states abdicated their historic role. 22 
Rather than deciding claims on state constitutional grounds, state 
courts merely followed U.S. Supreme Court precedent.23 During the 
1950s and 1960s, for example, "only ten state court decisions relied 
on state constitutional provisions to protect individual rights. "24 
13 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
14 Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Abortion, Privacy, and State Constitutional Law: A 
Speculation if (or l-Wien) Roe v. Wade is Overturned, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. 
L. 173, 177 (1989) (emphasis added). 
15 Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 640. 
16 Id. at 636. 
17 California v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975). 
18 Tepker, supra note 14, at 177. 
19 Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 636. 
20 Brisendine, 531 P.2d at 1113. 
21 J. Skelly Wright, Jn Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 188 (1984). 
22 Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 636. 
23 Id. at 636 (stating "state constitutional rights litigation [has] all but disappeared."). 
24 Id. . 
1993] THE ROAD NOT TAKEN 9 
This judicial hibernation waned in the 1970s, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court began to interpret the Fourth Amendment ever more 
narrowly. 25 These decisions gradually inspired a. rebellion among 
state court judges. Balking at what they perceived to be an 
unwarranted erosion of federal search and seizure protection, these 
judges turned to their state constitutions. Many found a greater level 
of protection than that discerned by the Supreme Court in the federal 
charter. 26 Soon this trend spread from the Fourth Amendment 
context to other constitutional issues, including the Fifth Amendment 
freedom from compelled self-incrimination,27 the freedom of speech,28 
2.S See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (allowing warrantless 
"inventory" searches); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (allowing the 
incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment to apply to the search of the 
person of a driver who was stopped on suspicion of driving with a revoked license); 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (upholding "consent" searches); 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not 
implicated when electronic surveillance equipment is hidden inside the clothing of an 
informant who engages the defendant in conversation). This erosion continued into the 
eighties. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (extending the permissible 
scope of warrantless automobile searches to closed containers, including luggage carried 
within the car); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that when the police 
have made a lawful "custodial arrest" of the occupant of an automobile, they may, 
incident to that arrest, search the car's entire passenger compartment and the contents 
of any containers found therein). 
26 See Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 734 (Alaska 1979) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme 
Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218 (1973)); State v. Maher, 550 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting Robinson); 
State v. Clyne, 541 P.2d 71, 72 (Colo. 1975) (rejecting Robinson); State v. Sarmiento, 
397 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth 
Amendment analysis in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)); Wagner v. 
Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Ky. 1979) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's 
restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 
(1976)); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (N .J. 1975) (rejecting "consent" searches 
like those authorized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973)); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme 
Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 
(1982)); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813-14 (Wash. 1986) (rejecting the U.S. 
Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735 (1979)). 
'II See State v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme 
Court's restrictive Fifth Amendment analysis in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 
(1971)); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 662-63 (Haw. 1971) (rejecting the U.S. 
Supreme Court's restrictive Fifth Amendment analysis in Harris); Commonwealth v. 
10 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI 
and, by the end of the 1980s, the right to privacy.29 
Justice Brennan has called the resurgence of state law "the 
most important development in constitutional jurisprudence in our 
times. 1130 Increased reliance on state constitutional provisions will 
likely shape the future of civil liberties litigation, especially with 
regard to privacy and reproductive freedom. But as states look once 
more to their own constitutions, they will need some guidance on 
how to ·construe state provisions vis-a-vis federal precedent. 
B. Differing Approaches to State Constitutional Interpretation 
Judges confronted with state constitutional claims must first 
consider the various approaches to state constitutional jurisprudence. 
Triplett, 341 A.2d 62, 64 (Pa. 1975) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive 
Fifth Amendment analysis in Harris). 
28 See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979) (finding 
California's free speech clause to confer broader protection than that guaranteed by the 
Federal First Amendment); Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 
1991) (finding Colorado's free speech clause to confer broader protection than that 
guaranteed by the Federal First Amendment); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626-27 
(N.J. 1980) (finding New Jersey's free speech clause to confer broader protection than 
that guaranteed by the Federal First Amendment). 
29 See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504(Alaska1975) (invoking the state's express 
privacy guarantee in recognizing the right to smoke marijuana in one's home); In re 
ConservatorshipofValerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 771-72 (Cal. 1985) (holding sterilization 
statute void on privacy and liberty grounds); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., 421 
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (holding that state privacy right guarantees terminally ill person 
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); State v. Kam,· 748 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw. 
1988) (holding that Hawaii's Constitution affords greater privacy rights than those 
provided under the U.S. Constitution); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 493 
(Ky. 1992) (striking down sodomy law on the grounds that it violated the Kentucky 
Constitution's right to privacy and equal protection and expressly rejecting the U.S. 
Supreme Court's restrictive privacy and equal protection analysis in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. 
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-26 (Mass. 1977) (holding that state privacy right 
guarantees terminally ill person the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); In re 
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (holding the state privacy right guarantees a 
terminally ill person the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); In re Welfare of 
Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1983) (holding the state privacy right guarantees a 
terminally ill person the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment). 
30 Brennan, supra note 13, at 497. 
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Scholars have documented several different modes of analysis. These 
include the "dual" approach,31 the "primacy" approach,32 and the 
31 Where state and federal constitutions are identical or similar, some states accord 
the same construction to both. Historically, this "dual" approach emerged before the 
application of the Federal Bill of Rights to the states, when states nonetheless strove to 
render decisions conforming to U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Utter & Pittler, supra 
note 12, at 645. The inevitable result is "'absolute deferential harmony' with Supreme 
Court interpretations." Id. The dual approach has been harshly criticized as a "non-
approach" because it substitutes the judgment of the federal court for the independent 
legal analysis of the state court concerning a state provision. Id. at 646. This approach 
propagates a "fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually 
identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart." 
California v. Brisendine, 531P.2d1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975). State constitutions have a 
legislative history wholly separate from the Federal Constitution, and usually state 
provisions are more expansive as positive declarations of rights. State courts should 
recall the unique features of their state constitutions when construing them. Obviously, 
complete deference to U.S. Supreme Court construction denigrates the state court's role, 
and highest duty, to construe independently and enforce state provisions. Utter & 
Pittler, supra note 12, at 647. States employing the dual approach not only fail lo 
develop a constitutional jurisprudence reflecting their unique history and heritage, they 
also confuse federal and state law. State courts adhering to this deferential mode of 
construction risk "that the Supreme Court, by interpreting the Federal Constitution, may 
later reverse or undermine the state court's ruling on its own constitution." Id. Such 
a result "contradicts the historical relationship between state and federal constitutions." 
Id. 
32 Under the "primacy" approach, courts faced with analogous ~tate and federal 
claims consider the state claims first. Mark Silverstein, Note, Privacy Rights in State 
Constutions: Models for Illinois'!, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215. If the court finds the state 
provision is dispositive of the issue, it does not even consider the federal claims. Id. 
"Courts using this approach do not consider federal law and analysis as presumptively 
valid, viewing them instead as no more persuasive than decisions of sister state supreme 
courts." Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 647. Rather, the court adopting the primacy 
approach "assumes 'that the states are the primary sovereigns and that the state 
constitutions are the basic charters of individual liberties."' Id. (quoting Developments 
in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 
1357 (1982)). As the California Supreme Court noted, "such independent construction 
does not represent an unprincipled exercise of power, but a means of fulfilling our 
solemn and independent constitutional obligation to interpret the safeguards guaranteed 
by the [state] Constitution in a manner consistent with ... [state] law. Committee to 
Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 783-84 (Cal. 1981). Because state 
courts following the primacy approach do not feel constrained by federal law, they can 
fully vindicate their role to protect fundamental freedom through an expansive 
construction of state provisions. Among the advantages of using the primacy approach 
are the "development of a sound body of stale constitutional law, protection of .state 
decisions from federal review, and promotion of a healthy federalism, in which federal 
12 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI 
11 supplemental 11 approach. 33 
Under the "dual" approach, state courts treat their state 
constitutions as mere reiterations of the federal charter. In construing 
state provisions, they simply parrot U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 
This approach prompted an exasperated dissent by a justice of the 
Nebraska Supreme Court: 
When called upon to construe the Nebraska 
Constitution, this court should not exhibit some 
Pavlovian conditioned reflex in an uncritical adoption 
of federal decisions as the construction to be placed 
on [the parallel provisions of our own Constitution].34 
It is inappropriate to assume that state and federal provisions are 
alike, given the unique legislative history, purpose, and text of state 
constitutions. By simply following federal precedent, state courts 
abdicate their duty to perform an independent interpretation of state 
and state courts respect each others' authority in their respective spheres." Utter & 
Pittler, supra note 12, at 647. 
33 The "supplemental" approach represents an accommodation between the dual and 
primacy modes of analysis. Courts first look to federal precedent for guidance. "If the 
Federal Constitution does not provide the requested relief, the supplemental approach 
directs the state court to turn to the state constitution as a potential supplement to the 
federal protections." Silverstein, supra note 32, at 217. While this approach presumes 
that federal precedent is valid, "state courts do not automatically follow the federal 
interpretation in construing state provisions." Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 649. 
This model stems from "a perceived need to foster uniformity and avoid conflict with 
federal precedent if at all possible," id. at 648, at least when the court is faced with 
analogous state and federal provisions. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 932 
(N.J. 1982). However, "[w]here provisions of the federal and state Constitutions differ 
... or where a previously established body of state Jaw leads to a different result, then 
we must determine whether an expansive grant of rights is mandated by our state 
Constitution." Id. Under this view, state constitutions serve as a "supplemental source 
of protection ... [and] provide greater protection ... than is provided by the federal 
Constitution .... " Robert A. Sedler, The Stale Constitutions and the Supplemental 
Protection of Individual Rights, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 465, 475 (1985). By regarding 
federal Jaw as a floor of minimum protection, upon which states can independently 
extend certain freedoms, this approach fosters a healthy respect for our federal system 
and for the unique roles of federal and state courts. Utter & Pittler, supra note 11, at 
638. 
34 State v. Havlat, 385 N.W.2d 436, 447 (Neb. 1986) (Shanahan, J., dissenting). 
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constitutions,35 and state courts abandon their historic role as 
guardians of liberty by following federal decisions that increasingly 
limit the scope of constitutional protection. 36 
By contrast, the "primacy" approach, which regards state 
constitutions as the primary source of freedom, epitomizes 
independent legal judgment by state courts. Under this approach, 
courts faced with analogous state and federal claims consider the state 
claims first. If the court finds the state provisions dispositive of the 
issue, it does not even consider the federal claims. 37 The primacy 
approach, however, is not well suited for most states at this early 
stage of state constitutional resurgence: 
[Most] states have a low level of state constitutional 
rights litigation. Some state courts have virtually no 
record of reliance on their state constitutions so that 
large sections of the country, including the Midwest, 
remain largely unaffected by the growing trend 
toward development of independent state 
constitutional jurisprudence. 38 
The "supplemental" approach, finally, offers a framework of 
analysis upon which most state courts will look favorably. Rather 
than dismissing entirely or adhering blindly to federal law, this 
35 See State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983). 
The point is not that a state's constitutional guarantees are more or 
less protective in particular applications, but that they were meant to 
be and remain genuine guarantees against misuse of the state's 
governmental powers, truly independent of the rising and falling 
tides of federal case law both in method and in specifics. State 
courts cannot abdicate their responsibility for these independent 
guarantees, at least not unless the people of the state themselves 
choose to abandon them and entrust their rights entirely to federal 
law. 
Id. State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1984) ("[S]tate courts have a duty to 
independently interpret and apply their state constitutions that stems from the very nature 
of our federal system and the vast differences between the federal and state constitutions 
and courts.") (emphasis added). 
36 Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 647. 
37 Silverstein, supra note 32, at 217. 
38 Sedler, supra note 33, at 474-75. 
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approach encourages state courts to draw distinctions between the 
state and federal charters, and to preserve their autonomy when 
construing a state provision that is different from its federal 
counterpart either textually or historically. 39 
C. Precedents in Which State Constitutional Provisions Were 
Construed to Afford Greater Protection for Individual Liberty 
Than Their Federal Counterparts 
In construing their own constitutions, state court judges are 
free to find greater protection for individual liberty than that found 
by federal judges in the United States Constitution.40 This is true 
even where the state and federal constitutions have similar or identical 
language. 41 
State courts in Alaska,42 Arizona,43 California,44 Colorado,45 
39 Utter & Pittler, supra note 12, at 638; Sedler, supra note 33, at 475. 
40 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
41 Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. at 293; Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81. 
42 Mickens v. City of Kodiak, 640 P.2d 818, 821 (Alaska 1982). The Alaska 
Constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution, prohibits municipalities from restricting-in 
places where liquor is sold-forms of expression that would otherwise enjoy First 
Amendment protection. Id. Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 83 n.6 (Alaska 1980) 
(recognizing that the Alaska Constitution confers a right to privacy that is broader than 
its federal counterpart); Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979) (rejecting the U.S. 
Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218 (1973)); Shagloak v. State, 597 P.2d 142, 144-45 (Alaska 1979) 
(recognizing that the Alaska Constitution imposes greater restrictions than the U.S. 
Constitution on the power of judges to impose harsher sentences on defendants convicted 
after changing their pleas from guilty to not guilty); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 
(Alaska 1975) (invoking the state's express privacy guarantee in recognizing the right 
to smoke marijuana in one's home); Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alaska 1974) 
(recognizing a broader freedom from compelled self-incrimination under the Alaska 
Constitution than that discerned in the Federal Fifth Amendment by the U.S. Supreme 
Court); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970) (recognizing 
a broader right to jury trials under the Alaska Constitution than that yet recognized by 
the U.S. Supreme Court under the Federal Constitution). 
43 Fiesta Mall Venture v. Meacham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719, 723 (Ariz. 1988) 
(recognizing that a state constitution may provide more expansive speech rights than 
those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261, 271 
(Ariz. 1984) (recognizing broader protection from double jeopardy under the Arizona 
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Connecticut,46 Delaware,47 Florida,48 Georgia,49 Hawaii,50 Illinois,51 
Constitution than that found by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Federal Constitution). 
44 Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 49 (1989) (Cal. C.A. 
Oct. 12, 1992) (recognizing that the express privacy guarantee contained in the 
California Constitution is broader than the federal right to privacy and striking down a 
parental-consent-for-abortion statute as violating the California Constitution's express 
privacy guarantee); In re Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985) 
(finding sterilization statute void on privacy and liberty grounds); State v. Ruggles, 702 
P.2d 170 (Cal. 1985) (search and seizure) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive 
Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)); Committee 
to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (1981); Robins v. Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979) (finding California's free speech clause 
to confer broader protection than that guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); State v. 
Maher, 550 P.2d 1044 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive 
Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)); State 
v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's 
restrictive Fifth Amendment analysis in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). 
45 Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991) (finding that 
Colorado's free speech clause confers broader protection than the U.S. Constitution); 
Conrad v. City of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 674 (Colo. 1983) (holding that a government 
display of nativity scene violated the state constitution); State v. Clyne, 541 P.2d 71, 72 
(Colo. 1975) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis 
in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). 
46 Daly v. DelPonte, 608 A.2d 93, 98 (Conn. 1992) (recognizing that Connecticut's 
equal protection clause is broader than its federal counterpart); State v. Morrill, 534 
A.2d 1165, 1169 (Conn. 1987) (recognizing that the state constitution affords greater 
substantive protection than does the Fourth Amendment in setting the standard for 
determining probable cause to search); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Conn. 1986) 
(concluding that a state regulation modeled after a federal medicaid program which 
restricts abortion funding violates the state constitution); Cologne v. Westfarms Assoc., 
469 A.2d 1201, 1206 (Conn. 1984) (recognizing that a state may provide speech rights 
more expansive than those guaranteed by the Federal Constitution). 
47 Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 421A.2d1334, 1347 (Del. 1980) (holding the 
state constitution affords a right to privacy which guarantees the guardian of a terminally 
ill person the right to assert the ill person's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment). 
48 In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989) (recognizing that Florida's 
Constitution extends the privacy right further than the Federal Constitution by allowing 
abortion for minors); State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643, 647 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting the 
U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in United States v. White, 
401 U.S. 745 (1970)). 
49 Pel Assoc. v. Joseph, 427 S.E.2d 264, 265 (Ga. 1993) (striking down, under 
Georgia's free speech clause, nude-dancing restrictions of the sort upheld under the First 
Amendment in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991)); Gary v. State, 422 
S.E.2d 426, 430 (Ga. 1992) (holding that the Georgia Constitution imposes more 
exacting search and seizure standards than the Federal Fourth Amendment, and refusing 
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Kentucky ,52 Louisiana,53 Maryland,54 Massachusetts,55 Michigan,56 
to recognize a "good faith exception" like that prevailing in federal search and seizure 
jurisprudence). 
50 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993) (recognizing, in dictum, that the 
state's equal protection clause may confer a right to same-sex marriage); State v. Kam, 
748 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw. 1988) (holding that Hawaii's Constitution affords greater 
privacy rights than those provided under the Federal Constitution); State v. Kaluna, 520 
P.2d 51, 58-59 (Haw. 1974) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth 
Amendment analysis in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)); State v. 
Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (Haw. 1971) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's 
restrictive Fifth Amendment analysis regarding self-incrimination in Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). 
51 State v. McCauley, 595 N.E.2d 583, 585-86 (Ill. 1992) (recognizing heightened 
protections against compelled self-incrimination under the state constitution). 
52 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 847 S.W.2d 487, 491-501 (Ky. 1992) (expressly 
rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive privacy analysis in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986), by striking down the state's sodomy law on the grounds that it 
violated the state constitution's right to privacy and equal protection); Wagner v. 
Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352, 355-56 (Ky. 1979) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme 
Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis regarding search and seizure in South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)). 
53 Banks v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 598 So.2d 515, 517 n.3 (La. 
Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that the right to privacy set forth in the Louisiana 
Constitution affords greater protection than its federal counterpart); State v. 
Vanderlindcr, 575 So. 2d 521, 523 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing that the right to 
privacy set forth in the Louisiana Constitution affords greater protection than its federal 
counterpart); State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 996-97 (La. 1989) (striking down a 
sobriety check roadblock which "may meet Fourth Amendment standards," but violated 
the "higher standard of individual liberty" afforded under the Louisiana Constitution). 
54 Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) (invoking the State Equal 
Rights Amendment to prohibit the state in a criminal prosecution from using peremptory 
challenges so as to exclude a person from service as a juror because of that person's 
sex). 
55 Commonwealth v. Ford, 476 N.E.2d 560, 564 (Mass. 1985) (holding that a more 
restrictive exclusionary rule exists under Massachusetts state law); Batchelder v. Allied 
Stores Int'!, 445 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Mass. 1983) (finding the Massachusetts free speech 
clause to confer broader protection than its federal counterpart); Moe v. Secretary of 
Admin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Mass. 1981) (holding that a state provision restricting 
medicaid funding of abortions violated the state due process guarantee); Superintendent 
of Belchertown State Schools v. Saikewicz, 370 N .E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977) (finding 
that a state privacy right guarantees a terminally ill person the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment). 
56 Sitz v. Department of State Police, 485 N .W.2d 135, 138 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding that the Michigan Constitution affords greater protection from unreasonable 
search and seizure than the Fourth Amendment, and invalidating sobriety checkpoints 
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Minnesota,57 Montana,58 New Hampshire,59 New Jersey,60 New 
York,61 North Carolina,62 Ohio,63 Oregon,64 Pennsylvania,65 Rhode 
which were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment), ajf'd 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 
1993); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Mich. 1985) 
(recognizing that a state may provide speech rights more expansive than those guaranteed 
by the U.S. Constitution); State v. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Mich. 1975) 
(rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis of search 
and seizure in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)); cf Hobbins v. Attorney 
General, No. 93-306-178-CZ, slip op. at 17 (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 20, 1993) 
(recognizing, in dictum, the "right to choose to cease living" under both the U.S. and 
Michigan Constitutions and striking down, on other grounds, a ban on assisted suicide). 
57 O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (rejecting the U.S. 
Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 
436 U.S. 547 (1978)). 
"State v. Sierra, 692 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Mont. 1985) (recognizing that the Montana 
Constitution affords greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than 
the Fourth Amendment); State v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Mont. 1977) (rejecting 
the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)). 
59 State v. Laurie, 606 A.2d 1077, 1080 (N.H. 1992) (recognizing that the New 
Hampshire Constitution confers more stringent protections against compelled self-
incrimination than the Federal Fifth Amendment); State v. Camargo, 498 A.2d 292 
(N .H. 1985) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment.analysis 
in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)). 
60 Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294 (N .J. 1985) (establishing an independent 
and stricter standard for equal protection analysis); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 
925 (N.J. 1982) (abortion funding); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980) (finding 
New Jersey's free speech clause to confer broader protection than that guaranteed by the 
U.S. Constitution); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (state privacy right 
guarantees terminally ill person the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); State v. 
Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N .J. 1975) (rejecting "consent" searches like those authorized by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)). 
61 Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1991), ajf'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 
(App. Div. 1993), appeal dismissed, 82 N.Y.2d 680, appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 68 
(1993) (striking down a provision which fails to allow funded abortions for women with 
incomes below the federal poverty line but funds prenatal care); State v. Scott, 593 
N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that the New York Constitution contains greater 
protection against improper searches and seizures by the police than is currently afforded 
by U.S. Supreme Court precedent). 
62 State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708, 712 (N .C. 1981) (recognizing that a state may 
provide speech rights more expansive than those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); 
State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 555-56 (N.C. 1988) (recognizing that the North 
Carolina Constitution confers greater protection against unreasonable search and seizure 
than the Federal Fourth Amendment). 
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Island,66 Tennessee,67 Texas,68 Utah,69 Vermont,70 Washington,71 and 
6.l State v. Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting the.U.S. 
Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454 (1981)); Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 27, 1992) 
(striking down an abortion statute that contained a mandatory 24-hour delay and biased 
counseling provisions of the sort upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Casey, by 
invoking liberty, equal protection, free speech, and freedom of conscience provisions in 
the Ohio Constitution). 
64 State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015 (Or. 1988) (refusing to adopt a broad "open 
fields" exception to warrantless searches and seizures and rejecting the U.S. Supreme 
Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 
(1984)); Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist., 715 P.2d 875 (Or. App. 1986) (religious 
invocation in high school commencement exercise violates the Oregon Constitution's 
religion clause); State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985) (free speech rights); State v. 
Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323-26 (Or. 1983) (recognizing broader protection from 
double jeopardy under the Oregon Constitution than· that found by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the Federal Constitution); State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802 (Or. 1983) (state 
constitutional basis for search and seizure exclusionary rule). 
65 Commonwealth v. Danforth, 576 A.2d 1013, 1022 (Pa. 1990) (recognizing greater 
restrictions on blood, breath, and urine tests under the Pennsylvania Constitution than 
those found by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Federal Fourth Amendment); 
Commonwealth v. Grossman, 555 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1989) (holding that the warrant 
requirement in the Pennsylvania Constitution is "more exacting" than its counterpart in 
the U.S. Constitution); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut 
General Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1333-34 (Pa. 1986) (recognizing that a state may 
provide speech rights more expansive than those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); 
Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341A.2d62 (Pa. 1975) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's 
restrictive Fifth Amendment analysis in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). 
66 Pimental v. DepartmentofTransp., 561A.2d1348, 1350 (R.I. 1989) (recognizing 
that state supreme courts have the right and power to impose higher standards on 
searches and seizures under state constitutions and that the Federal Constitution only 
establishes a minimum level of protection). 
67 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598-603 (Tenn. 1992) (recognizing a right of 
"procreational autonomy" in the Tennessee Constitution's implicit privacy guarantee, and 
applying it in the context of a divorcing couple's fight over possession of frozen 
embryos); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. McWherter, No. 92C-1672 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 
Nov. 19, 1992) (construing the right of procreational autonomy under the Tennessee 
Constitution and, based on that right, striking down a mandatory 72-hour delay on 
abortions for adult women as well as a residency requirement under the state equal 
protection clause). 
611 Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (rejecting the 
U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis for inventory searches in 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (relying on a state constitutional provision that 
requires the legislature to establish and support free public schools and invalidating a 
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West Virginia72 have recognized and acted upon this principle. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, referring to the state and 
federal constitutions, observed that citizens enjoy a "double-barrelled 
source of protection . which safeguards tl:teil'. privacy from 
unauthorized and unwarranted intrusions" by the ·government. 73 It 
stressed that state courts, when interpreting their own constitutions, 
have the right and the power to implement 'standards of individual 
liberty which are higher than those required by , the Federal 
Constitution. 74 
In a similar context, the Supreme Court of Hawaii observed: 
public education finance system which had survived Federal Equal Protection challenges 
in San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 441 U.S. 1 (1973)). 
69 State v. Hygh, 711P.2d264,,272 n.1(Utah1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) 
(rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth Amendment analysis in United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)). 
70 Doe v. Celani, No. S81-84 (Vt. Super. Ct. 1986) (abortion funding) (slip opinion 
unavailable; cited in JaniceSteinschneider, Note, State Constitutions: The New Battle.field 
for Abortion Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 284, 287 (1987)). 
71 State v. Griffith, 808 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Wash. 1991) (recognizing that the 
Washington Constitution confers greater protection for privacy interests than the Federal 
Fourth Amendment); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 
780 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Wash. 1989) (recognizing that a state may provide speech rights 
more expansive than those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); State v. Gunwall, 720 
P.2d 808, 814 (Wash. 1986) (rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive Fourth 
Amendment analysis in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)); In re Colyer, 660 
P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983) (state privacy right guarantees terminally ill person the right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment). 
72 Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Panepinto, 1993 W. Va. LEXIS 228 (W. Va. Dec. 
17, 1993) (striking down restrictions on public funding of abortion under equal 
protection and substantive due process theories advanced under the West Virginia 
Constitution); State v. Bonham, 317 S.E.2d 501, 503 (W. Va. 1984) (recognizing that 
the West Virginia Constitution imposes greater restrictions on the power of judges to 
issue harsher sentences to those whose convictions are sustained after exercising their 
statutory right to a trial de novo in the court of appeals and expressly rejecting the U.S. 
Supreme Court's restrictive due process analysis in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 
(1972)); Peters v. Narick, 270 S.E.2d 760, 764-65 (W. Va. 1980) (applying strict 
scrutiny in gender-discrimination cases based on state remedies guarantee). 
73 Pimental v. Department of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1350 (R.I. 1989) (citation 
omitted). 
74 Id. at 1350; see supra note 66. 
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[W]hile this results in a divergence of meaning 
between words which are the same in both state and 
federal constitutions, the system of federalism 
envisaged by the United States Constitution tolerates 
such divergence where the result is greater protection 
of individual rights under state law than under federal 
law.15 
The future of reproductive freedom in this country may 
depend largely on the willingness of state court judges to find a 
heightened level of protection for individual liberty in their state 
constitutions. 
Ill. Post-Casey America: Fifty New Battlegrounds 
A. Casey's "Undue Burden" Standard 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,16 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the substantive liberty 
guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment, while barring states from 
banning abortion outright,77 nevertheless leaves them ample latitude 
in restricting access to abortion. 78 In so holding, the Court 
established a new standard-the "undue burden" test-for gauging the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations.79 Under this standard, strict 
scrutiny will be applied only to those regulations that impose a 
"substantial obstacle" in the paths of women seeking abortions. 80 
In applying this standard, the Court showed that only the most 
onerous restrictions will be deemed to represent an "undue burden." 
Faced with a variety of provisions, the Court struck down only a 
husband-notification requirement. 81 It upheld a mandatory 24-hour 
15 State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (Haw. 1974) (emphasis added). 
76 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
77 Id. at 2804. 
78 Id. at 2820-21. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 2821. 
81 Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2829-30. 
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delay, 82 as well as a requirement that prospective patients 
receive-under the guise of "informed consent"-a state-printed 
brochure designed to dissuade them from having an abortion. 83 
One would imagine that from a woman's perspective these 
provisions do impose "substantial" obstacles in the path to an 
abortion. The 24-hour delay, by effectively requiring two separate 
trips to the clinic, 84 imposes special hardships on poor and rural 
women, many of whom must travel great distances to reach the clinic 
82 Id. at 2825-26. 
83 See id. at 2824 ("[w)e permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the 
life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and 
informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over 
abortion."). 
84 Mandatory delays are invariably accompanied by "informed consent" counseling 
requirements. For example, in Pennsylvania and Ohio, a woman must receive certain 
state-printed materials and, in addition, complete a face-to-face informational meeting 
with a physician, at least 24 hours before the procedure is perfonned. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2317.56(8) (Anderson 1992); Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220. Under these provisions, it is impossible to 
combine-in one visit-both the infonned consent counseling and the abortion procedure 
itself. Most, if not all, women will have to visit the abortion clinic twice: first, for the 
infonnational visit, and second, for the abortion itself. Other physicians, including 
family practitioners or physicians outside the 08/GYN specialty, will not be able to 
satisfy the informational requirements imposed by the statute. The Ohio requirements 
mandate that the physician describe: (1) the particular abortion procedure to be used; 
(2) the medical risks associated with that procedure; (3) the medical risks associated with 
abortion generally; (4) the probable gestational age of the fetus; and (5) the medical risks 
associated with carrying the pregnancy to tenn. See, e.g., id. at§ 2317.56 (B)(l) 
(Anderson 1992). Family practitioners and physicians outside the 08/GYN specialty 
will not be able to satisfy these infonnational requirements. Thus, the woman will be 
left with little choice but to visit the abortion clinic for the requisite "counseling." This 
is true for two additional reasons. First, many women who obtain abortions in one state 
actually reside in another state, see Lisa Belkin, Woman Behind the Symbols in Abortion 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1989, § 1, at 18; they cannot rely on local physicians to 
satisfy the requirements of a foreign statute. Second, referring physicians cannot be 
counted on to provide the state-printed brochure typically required under these statutes. 
Such brochures must be purchased from the government of the state where the abortion 
is perfonned. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE§ 2317.56 (D). Physicians who do not 
actually perfonn abortions have no reason to incur the expense of purchasing these 
brochures. Thus, mandatory 24-hour delays effectively require most, if not all, women 
to make two separate trips to the clinic-once for the informational visit, and a second 
time for the abortion procedure itself. 
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and cannot afford the cost of an overnight stay. 85 The "informed 
consent" materials confront the woman with pictures of the fetus "at 
two-week gestational increments" so that she can see its "probable 
anatomical and physiological characteristics" deep into the third 
trimester. 86 These materials are transparently designed to traumatize 
the woman and to convey a message that the government (indeed, 
that her doctor}81 disapproves of her choice. 88 
85 A requirement prompting multiple trips to the clinic will necessarily compound the 
burdens and costs already borne by women seeking abortions. Take, for example, the 
facts prevailing in Ohio. In a recent challenge to Casey-type restrictions there, the 
unrefuted testimony established that 77 of Ohio's 88 counties have no abortion provider; 
that one third of Ohio patients travel over 50 miles one way to reach a clinic; that the 
need for traveling long distances causes women to delay or forego obtaining an abortion; 
that the burdens of travel fall heaviest upon the poorest, youngest, and least sophisticated 
women; that lengthy travel results in child care expenses, time lost from work, and 
physical and emotional strain; that all of the foregoing problems are compounded by the 
burdens and delays associated with multiple trips to the clinic; that multiple trips will 
cause women to obtain abortions later in their pregnancies; that the later an abortion is 
performed, the greater the risk of complications and death; and that, faced wit~ the 
prospect of multiple trips, some women will be forced to incur lodging costs for an 
overnight stay-thereby losing confidentiality because of the need for explaining their 
overnight absence to family, friends, and employers. Affidavit of Stanley K. Henshaw, 
Ph.D., Voinovich, 1992 Ohio LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 18, 1992). Thus, mandatory 
delays have the necessary effect of subjecting women to substantially greater costs, 
burdens, and medical risks. 
86 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2836. 
87 Typically, the state-printed brochure must be delivered to the woman by her 
doctor. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE§ 2317.56 (B)(3)(b). The fact that her doctor is 
delivering this "information" may suggest to the woman that the doctor disapproves of 
her decision to abort. Affidavit of John Fletcher, Ph.D., Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. 
LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 18, 1992). 
88 
"Informed consent" provisions of the type enacted in Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 3205 (1992), Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Baldwin 1994), 
Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann.§ 41-41-33 (1993), and North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code 
§ 14-02.1-02, typically require that each woman seeking an abortion receive state-printed 
materials containing pictures or descriptions of the fetus "at two-week gestational 
increments" so that she can see its "probable anatomical and physiological 
characteristics"; information about the possibility of fetal survival; a list of agencies and 
services that are available to assist the woman through pregnancy and childbirth; an 
explanation of the availability of medical assistance benefits for prenatal care, childbirth, 
and neonatal care; and information about the father's obligation to provide child support 
payments. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE§ 2317.56 (B), (C). In addition to receiving these 
stat~printed materials, the woman must also complete a fac~to-face counseling session 
with a physician-and all of this must occur more than 24 hours before the abortion can 
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The significance of the undue burden test may be seen in one, 
simple fact: It was used in Casey to uphold precisely the type of 
restrictions that the Court struck down in 198389 and 1986.90 At that 
time, the Court had little .. patience for schemes· by the government to 
disseminate anti-abortion sentiments "[u]nder the guise of informed 
consent. "91 In refreshingly frank language, the Court observed: 
The printed materials . . . seem to us to be nothing 
less than an outright attempt to wedge the [state's] 
message discouraging abonion into the privacy of the 
informed-consent dialogue between the woman and 
her physician. The mandated description of fetal 
characteristics at two-week intervals, no matter how 
objective, is plainly overinclusive. This is not 
medical information that is always relevant to the 
woman's decision, and it may serve only to confuse 
and punish her and to heighten her ail:tiety, contrary 
to accepted medical practice. 92 
In Casey, this frankness is replaced by a sudden inability to discern 
the heavy-handed preaching that the Court previously found so 
be performed. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE§ 2317.56 (B). No matter how objectively 
it is conveyed, the state-mandated "information" will necessarily communicate an anti-
abortion message from the government. In particular, the pictures of fetal development 
and the information about fetal survival are designed to inspire, and will certainly create, 
feelings of guilt, shame, and anxiety in the woman, thereby dissuading her from having 
an abortion. Affidavit of Jay Katz, M.D., Voinovich, 1992 Ohio LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. 
May 18, 1992). Thus, these provisions exploit the informed consent dialogue, using it 
as an opportunity for disseminating an anti-abortion message-a government-sponsored, 
doctor-delivered message-that interferes with a woman's reproductive decisionmaking. 
89 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking 
down a mandatory 24-hour delay). 
90 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747 (1986) (striking down biased counseling provisions, including a requirement that 
C?JlCh woman seeking an abortion receive a state-printed brochure containing pictures or 
descriptions of fetal development). 
91 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763. 
9'l Id. at 762-63 (emphasis added). 
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objectionable. 93 
Thus, by means of the undue burden test, Casey substantially 
lowered the floor of minimum protection for reproductive autonomy, 
which the federal right to privacy had long sustained. The precise 
level of this "floor" is undetermined-and efforts are already 
underway in state legislatures to lower it as far as the undue burden 
test will permit. 94 Our question is whether the heightened protections 
formerly conferred by the Federal Constitution can be restored by 
means of state constitutional provisions. 
B. Testing the Limits of the "Undue Burden" Standard: 
Harsher Restrictions Loom on the Horizon 
Inevitably, Casey will be viewed by some state legislators as 
an invitation to enact comparable, if not harsher, restrictions on 
access to abortion. 95 Indeed, many states have recently imposed 
mandatory delays and biased counseling requirements of the sort 
upheld in Casey. 96 Some states even require delays of forty-eight 
Id. 
93 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823. 
It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of 
health. Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an 
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not 
dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a woman 
apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers 
the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect 
an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological 
consequences, that her decision was not fully informed. 
94 See infra part 111.B. 
95 See Estelle H. Rogers, Change of Venue: Abortion Regulation in the Stales, 3 TEX. 
J. WoMF.N & L. 123 (1994) (charting recent legislative developments). 
96 These states include Alabama, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, and Tennessee. The Status of Women's Reproductive Freedom, REPROD. 
FREEooM IN nm STATF.S. (Center for Reprod. Law & Policy, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 1992 
at 3-9 [hereinafter IN THE STATES]. Comparable legislation is in conference committee, 
but has yet to be enacted, in Michigan. Id. at 7. In 1992, Casey-type provisions were 
narrowly defeated in the Nebraska and South Carolina legislatures. Id. at 8, 10. 
However, this year such restrictions were adopted by Nebraska lawmakers. In the 
Stales: Legislative Action, REPROD. FREEDOM NEWS (Ctr. for Reprod. L. & Pol'y, New 
York, N.Y.), June 18, 1993 at 7. 
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hours97 and seventy-two hours98 for all women seeking abortions. 
Certain states have enacted virtual bans on abortion. 99 Likewise, 
abortion bans have been proposed in ballot initiatives in several 
states. 100 
Though the most extreme of these measures have been 
"' Maine enacted a 48 hour mandatory waiting period for all women seeking 
abortions, whic.h was subsequently struck down by a federal district court. Women's 
Community Health Ctr., Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 550 (Me. 1979). 
98 The Tennessee legislature enacted a 72 hour delay in 1992. IN THE STATES, supra 
note 96, at 10-11. That provision was struck down by a state trial court judge in 
Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. McWherter, No. 92C-1672, slip op. at 19-20 (Tenn. 
Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 1992). In 1992 the Colorado legislature rejected efforts to enact a 72 
hour waiting period. IN THE STATES, supra note 96, at 4. 
99 Sweeping restrictions on abortion have been enacted in Louisiana, Utah, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-7-302 (1993), and Guam. In these jurisdictions, abortions are banned 
except to save a woman's life; Louisiana and Utah also permit an exception in cases of 
rape or incest. IN THE STATF.S, supra note96, at 6, 11, 12. On September22, 1992, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Louisiana statute. Sojourner 
v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992). Proponents of the Louisiana measure are 
currently seeking review of that decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. IN THE STATES, 
supra note 96, at 6. The court found Utah's statute less restrictive than Pennsylvania's, 
held against the plaintiffs who challenged it and awarded costs and fees to defendants. 
See Utah Women's Health Clinic v. Leavitt, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2279 at *8, *39 (D. 
Utah Feb. 1, 1994). On November 30, 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review 
a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit striking down Guam's 
statute. IN THE STATF.S, supra note 96, at 12. In South Dakota, a bill banning abortion 
was defeated by only one vote in the state senate in 1991. Id. at 10. 
100 In Arizona, the electorate rejected a ballot referendum in 1992 that would have 
banned abortion. IN THE STATES, supra note 96, at 3. In Colorado, the state supreme 
court recently thwarted efforts by anti-choice groups to place an abortion ban on the 
ballot. Id. at 4. Likewise, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in August 1992 ruled that a 
statewide initiative banning abortion could not appear on the November ballot because, 
if passed, it would violate Casey. In re Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1992). 
Anti-choice supporters of this initiative are seeking U.S. Supreme Court review. IN THE 
STATES, supra note 96, at 9. In 1990, Oregon voters defeated a statewide ballot 
referendum proposing a ban on abortion. Id. at 10. In Wyoming, anti-choice activists 
did not obtain the requisite signatures needed to place an abortion ban on the ballot in 
1992, but have collected the quantity of names needed to submit the measure for 
approval in the 1994 election. Id. at 12. In October 1993, the Wyoming measure 
survived a pre-election challenge filed in state court. REPROD. FREEDOM NEWS (Ctr. for 
Reprod. L. & Pol'y, New York, N.Y.) Oct. 22, 1993 at 12. 
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defeated, 101 the great volume of this legislative activity shows that 
even more agitation may be expected in Casey's wak:e. 102 This is true 
not only because of the abiding preoccupation with abortion in so 
many state capitols, but also because the very novelty of the undue 
burden standard will prompt efforts to test its limits. 
Two separate questions will arise in this new round of 
legislation and litigation. First, will application of the undue burden 
standard vary from state to state? Second, what are the outer limits 
of permissible regulation under the new standard? 
The first question may be phrased more precisely as follows: 
Once the Supreme Court determines that a particular regulation is not 
an undue burden, does this finding apply in all fifty states? What 
about variations in local circumstances? In gauging the impact of a 
twenty-four hour waiting period, for example, shouldn't we consider 
the number of abortion clinics within the particular state, their 
geographic distribution, and the number of miles a woman must 
travel to reach a clinic? Even if upheld in Pennsylvania, where 
clinics are scatte'red throughout the state, might not such a provision 
create an undue burden in North Dakota, which has only one clinic? 
This question has yet to be resolved. The Supreme Court 
seemed to indicate that local circumstances do not matter when it 
denied certiorari in a Mississippi suit where Casey-type provisions, 
including a twenty-four hour delay, were upheld. 103 Obviously, 
denials of certiorari are not reliable indicators of where the Court is 
headed, but the Mississippi case would have been a perfect vehicle 
for addressing this · question. The challenged provisions· were 
101 See supra notes 96-100. Bui see Barnes v. State, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1993), 
cerl. denied, 114 S.Ct. 468 (1993) (upholding a Mississippi statute requiring minors to 
obtain written permission from both parents before having an abortion, finding this 
requirement not to be an "undue burden"). 
102 See, e.g., Utah H.R. 129, 50th Legis., Gen. Sess. (1994). 
103 Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992), cerl. denied, 113 S.Ct. 656 
91992) (upholding Mississippi's informed consent statute as "substantially identical" to 
the Pennsylvania provisions upheld in Casey). More recently, Justice Souter rejected 
efforts in the Casey litigation to revive the plaintiffs' facial challenge by means of a new 
trial-in which additional evidence would be adduced in an attempt to satisfy the new 
"undue burden" standard. 114 S. Ct. 909 (in chambers opinion, Souter, Circuit Justice 
1993). The Third Circuit denied plaintiffs a new trial, and Justice Souter, acting in his 
capacity as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, refused to stay enforcement of those 
provisions in the Pennsylvania statute that were upheld in its 1992 decision. Id. 
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virtually identical to those at issue in Casey, while the local 
circumstances in Mississippi are very different from Pennsylvania. 
In Pennsylvania, for example, nearly sixty percent of the women 
seeking abortions in 1988 lived within an hour's drive to a clinic. 104 
In Mississippi, on the other hand, seventy-nine of the eighty-two 
counties have no abortion provider.105 Nearly half of all women 
obtaining abortions there must travel over 100 miles one way. 106 
Thus, mandatory delays pose a greater burden on women in 
Mississippi than on women in Pennsylvania. Might not such a 
burden be "undue?" 107 
The second question involves the outer limits of permissible 
regulation under the new standard. Biased counseling provisions and 
mandatory delays of twenty-four hours are now approved. On the 
other end of the spectrum, outright bans on abortion are 
impermissible. What remains is a vast expanse of middle ground or 
uncharted territory. The only guidepost that currently exists is the 
husband-notification provision invalidated in Casey. 108 This leaves 
state legislators wide latitude to test the limits of the undue burden 
standard, concocting ever more stringent restrictions in what will 
become a new generation of abortion cases. 
The most likely scenario is that states will enact, in a ratchet-
like manner, a series of increasingly restrictive provisions, using as 
their starting point the various st.atutes already upheld by the Supreme 
Court. Thus, if a twenty-four hour delay is permissible, 109 why not 
impose a seventy-two hour wait? The Tennessee legislature has 
already enacted such a measure. 110 If viability testing may be 
104 Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
105 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline to Hear Mississippi Abortion Case, 
N.Y.TIMF.S, Dec.8, 1992, at A22. 
IOtS Id. at 79. 
107 It seems likely that these questions will be resolved in the context of as-applied, 
rather than facial challenges. Justice Souter indicated as much in refusing to stay 
enforcement of the Pennsylvania provisions upheld in Casey, 114 S.Ct. 909 (in chambers 
opinion, Souter, Circuit Justice 1993). 
108 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830-31. 
109 Id. at 2825-26. 
110 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-202(b)(6)(d)(l) (1993). That provision was struck 
down by a state trial court judge in Planned Parenthood Assoc., Inc. v. McWherter, slip 
op. at 19-20, No. 92C-1672 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 1992) (recognizing a right of 
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required at twenty weeks gestation,1 11 why not fifteen weeks? If the 
state is free to exploit "informed consent" counseling as a vehicle for 
disseminating an anti-abortion message, 112 why not require every 
patient to view a state-produced videotape containing pictures of 
aborted fetuses? 
Within ten years, the outer boundaries of the undue burden 
standard will have come into focus. In the meantime, defenders of 
reproductive freedom should consider alternatives to the 
liberty /privacy theory that has so long sustained them. 
C. Fighting Back: The Search for New Legal Theories 
Except for a line of cases vindicating the right of indigent 
women to public funding of abortion, 113 state constitutions have been 
utterly neglected, until quite recently, by lawyers working to advance 
the cause of reproductive freedom. Within the past year, however, 
lawyers in Tennessee, 114 California, 11s and Ohio116 have successfully 
invoked their state constitutions in challenging restrictions on 
abortion. These recent victories demonstrate that state court judges, 
in construing their state constitutions, may be willing to recognize a 
higher degree of protection for reproductive autonomy than that 
afforded by the Federal Constitution. 
In Tennessee, the court recognized a right of "procreational 
autonomy" under the state constitution in striking down a seventy-two 
"procreational autonomy" under the Tennessee Constitution). 
111 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
112 See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823-24. 
113 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
114 Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. McWherter, No. 92C-1672 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 
Nov. 19, 1992). 
115 American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, No. A040911 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Oct. 12, 1992). 
116 Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 27, 1992), reversed, 627 
N.E.2d 570, dismissed, 624 N.E.2d 194, reh 'g denied 626 N.E.2d 693 (the trial court 
struck down a mandatory 24 hour delay and biased counseling provisions under liberty, 
equal protection, free speech, and freedom of conscience provisions in the Ohio 
Constitution, but was subsequently reversed). 
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hour waiting period. 117 In Ohio, the court invalidated a twenty-four 
hour delay and biased counseling requirements under state 
constitutional guarantees of liberty, 118 equal protection, 119 freedom of 
speech, 120 and "freedom of conscience. "121 The court also relied upon 
the Federal Equal Protection Clause. 122 In California, the court relied 
on that state's express right to privacy in striking down a parental 
consent statute. 123 
These cases show that viable new theories are available, and 
that they fall into three groups: 
(1) state constitutional provlSlons with direct 
counterparts in the Federal Constitution (e.g., 
liberty and equal protection); 
(2) state constitutional provisions with no federal 
counterpart (e.g., express privacy and 
"freedom of conscience" guarantees); and 
(3) provisions in the Federal Constitution not yet 
presented to the Supreme Court as a basis for 
abortion rights (e.g., equal protection). 
This article will now demonstrate how all of these theories might be 
employed in vindicating the reproductive autonomy of women. 124 
117 Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. v. McWherter, No. 92C-1672, slip op. at 19-20 
(Tenn. Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 1992). 
118 Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. May 27, 1992). 
119 Id. at 13-15. 
120 Id. at 11-13. 
121 Id. at 10-11. 
122 Id. at 15, 28. 
123 American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 263 Ca. Rptr. 46, 49 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989). 
124 My equal protection analysis, though directed primarily at state constitutional 
claims, is applicable in part to claims under the Federal Constitution. See infra notes 
238-60 and accompanying text. 
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IV. How a State Constitution Might Be Employed in Challenging 
Abortion Regulations of the Sort Already Upheld Under the 
Federal Constitution 
A. The Example of Ohio 
In explaining how a state constitution might be employed in 
challenging restrictions on abortion, we will focus on the example of 
a single state-Ohio .. Many states have shown a special reluctance to 
interpret their constitutions independently. 125 Ohio courts have long 
treated their state constitution as a mere reiteration of the federal 
charter. 126 Moreover, Ohio has often been the scene of fierce 
. abortion battles. 127 Thus, Ohio provides a good illustration of the 
challenges to be faced by lawyers who employ state constitutions in 
the cause of reproductive freedom. 
B. The Unique Text and History of Ohio's Constitution 
When invoking a state constitution, the first task is to 
emphasize its unique text and history. 128 This· is necessary in order 
to overcome the pervasive judicial tendency to view state constitutions 
as empty reiterations of the federal charter. · 
In fact, state constitutions depart dramatically from the federal 
text. This is particularly true of their protections for fundamental 
rights. The federal Bill of Rights is phrased negatively, as a restraint 
on governmental power. The First Amendment, for example, begins: 
"Congress shall make no law ... "129 and each succeeding provision 
in the Bill of Rights is framed. as a "Thou Shalt Not." Most state 
constitutions, on the other hand, express these guarantees in 
125 Sedler, supra note 33, at 474-75. 
126 See infra notes 139-58 and accompanying text. 
127 See, e.g., Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. v. Ohio, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) 
(Akron I) (requiring 24-hour delay on abortions); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. 
Health, Inc., 479 U.S. 502 (1990) (Akron II) (requiring parental consent). 
128 See State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985) (outlining an approach to briefing 
state constitutional theories). 
129 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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affirmative, rather than negative, language. Compare, for example, 
the free speech clause of the Ohio Constitution-"Every citizen may 
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to 
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press"130-to its 
counterpart in the Federal Constitution-"Congress shall make no law 
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "131 These 
. textual differences are so striking that a court, when presented with 
the contrast, should hesitate before pronouncing that both be given 
the identical construction. 132 If a court were interpreting contractual 
terms, would it conclude, as readily as some courts have,133 that these 
clauses are coextensive? 
Thus, textual differences between the state and federal 
charters may be employed in urging a more expansive interpretation 
of the state provision. But even if the state provision is identical to 
its federal counterpart the unique history of the state constitution-the 
factual circumstances prompting its creation, the legislative 
deliberations surrounding its composition, and the ratification debates 
that led to its adoption-may justify a broader construction. 
Accordingly, lawyers planning to utilize a state constitution 
must perform historical research into its origins. Just as James 
130 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11. 
131 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
132 See infra Part N. D. 3. a. As is apparent, Ohio's free speech provision contains 
two distinct clauses, one that is phrased in "positive" language, and one that is phrased 
in "negative" language. State free speech provisions may be grouped into three 
categories: those that emulate the exclusively "negative" language of the Federal First 
Amendment, see, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; those that confer speech rights in 
sweeping "affirmative" language, see, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I,§ 5; and those, that 
combine affirmative and negative clauses; see, e.g., R.l. CONST. art. I, § 21. 
133 See State v. Lacey, 465 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 1991); Woodland v. 'Michigan 
Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 344 (Mich. 1985); SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven 
Hall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (N.Y. 1985); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 
Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1334 (Pa. 1986); Jacobs 
v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 841 (Wis. 1987). A number of states have recognized, 
however, that the "positive" language in the free speech clauses of their state 
constitutions confers broader protection than the Federal First Amendment. See, e.g., 
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979); Block v. 
·Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 
(N.J. 1980), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Ferner v. Toledo-Lucas County 
Convention & Vistors' Bureau, Inc., 610 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). 
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Madison and Thomas Jefferson are cited by litigants advancing a 
particular interpretation of the Federal Constitution, "founding 
fathers" of the state constitution should likewise be identified and 
invoked. In most states, unfortunately, the historical record will 
hardly be accessible. The sources are few and far between, and they 
are not likely to include an equivalent to The Federalist Papers. 
Nevertheless, the search is well worth pursuing. In Ohio, for 
example, one finds intriguing evidence that the state's early politics 
were dominated by settlers from Virginia who brought with them a 
Jeffersonian passion for individual liberty. 134 · 
Equally intriguing is the libertarian spirit that animated the 
drafters of Ohio's first Constitution. 135 That charter, drafted in 1802, 
134 Soon after the Northwest Ordinance was passed July 13, 1787, the State of 
Virginia acquired some four million acres of land north of the Ohio River. This tract 
became known as the Virginia Military District because the Gov. of Virginia awarded 
plots of land to soldiers for their valiant service in the Revolution. See R.C. Downes, 
Frontier Ohio: 1788 to 1803, 3 OHIO HIST. COLLECTIONS 81 (1935). As a result, 
Virginians dominated the early settlement of Ohio and exerted great influence over the 
political climate of the Territory. Pioneers from Virginia founded such Ohio cities as 
Manchester (1791) and Chillicothe (1796), which became the political center of the 
Territory. •Around Chillicothe as a center of Virginian settlers gathered some of the 
noted men of Ohio's early history, such men as Tiffin the first governor; McArthur, a 
. later governor; Worthington a United States Senator from Ohio, and Baldwin speaker 
of the lower houseofthe legislature." R.E. CHADDOCK, OHIO BEFORE 1850: A STUDY OP 
nm FARLY INFLUENCE OF F'PNNSYLVANIA AND SOUTHERN FbPULATIONS IN OHIO Z36 (l~). The 
earliest laws of the Territory were copied from existing laws in Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
and Kentucky. Id. at 237. 
By 1799, the Territory had grown sufficiently populous to create the first 
territorial legislature as prescribed by the Northwest Ordinance. Virginian settlers who 
followed the ideals of Thomas Jefferson dominated the legislature. Id. at 241-42. 
Increasingly dissatisfied with the territorial regime and especially with the unbridled 
power of Governor Arthur St. Clair, who enjoyed an absolute veto over legislative acts, 
these men led Ohio's quest for statehood. "Jefferson was the guiding spirit of these 
men, the friend of the West. The spirit of individual liberty and opposition to a paternal 
control was in the air among the people moving into the Northwest Territory." Id. at 
235. The legislature galvanized an intense political movement that succeeded in passing 
the enabling act to form the State of Ohio on Apr. 30, 1802. Id. · 
m The delegates to the first constitutional convention of Ohio met in Chillicothe on 
Nov. 1, 1802. "It was their purpose to remedy the supposed evils of the former system 
and to introduce a thoroughly democratic form of government in harmony with the ideas 
and needs of the people." CHADDOCK, supra note 134, at 62. Once again, the Virginians 
assumed leadership at this critical juncture in Ohio's history. Edward Tiffin, a 
Virginian, was selected to preside over the convention. Id. at 63. Of 20 delegates 
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provided a more inclusive enumeration of rights and imposed more 
restraints on governmental power over individual liberty than did the 
Federal Bill of Rights .136 Moreover, during the second constitutional 
convention of 1851, the delegates not only preserved the declaration 
of rights but moved it to a position of prominence, at the very front 
of the new Constitution. 137 It has remained there, undiluted, ever 
whose backgrounds were traced, nine were from Virginia. Id. at 62. These Virginians 
exerted considerable influence over the convention by chairing major committees. A 
study of the committees shows clearly the control that.Jefferson's followers exerted over 
both the proceedings and the convention's result. Id. at 63. During the debates of 
Ohio's first convention, "[a] central theme ... was the placing of all the agencies of the 
State subject to the will of the people who had been so long deprived o~ a real share in 
political life." R.C. Downes, Ohio's First Convention, 25 NORTHWF.ST Omo Q. 12, 17 
(1953). 
136 Ohio's first Constitution, drafted in 1802, proclaimed that "every free 
government, being founded on [the people's] sole authority, [is] organized for the great 
purpose of protecting their rights and liberties, aild securing their independence .... " 
Omo CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1802). As one historian has marveled, "UJudging by 
modem standards, [the Ohio Constitution is a] liberal document. Judging by the 
standards of [1802) it was radical." DoWNF.S, supra note 134, at 1. In fact, when 
· compared with other state constitutions during the same time period, Ohio's first 
Constitution "shows advances toward a more radical democratic view." CHADDOCK, 
supra note 134, at 66. The theme of individual liberty permeated the 1802 document. 
It declared, for example, "[A] frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of civil 
government is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty." Omo CONST. 
art. VIII, § 18 (1802). General search warrants and standing armies in times of peace 
were declared "dangerous to liberty." Id. at §§ 6 and 20 (1802). The Ohio 
Constitution followed the Federal Bill of Rights in protecting freedom of speech and 
assembly, and trial by jury. Id. at§§ 6, 19, 8. However, the 1802 Constitution was 
distinctive from the federal document in a number of respects. Among positive rights 
guaranteed to the people, the Ohio charter provided for redress in courts with "due 
course of law." Id. at § 7 (1802). Moreover, the 1802 Constitution conferred a 
"freedom of conscience" provision which remains to this day more expansive than the 
Federal Free Exercise and Establishment clauses. Id. at § 3 (1802). Among restraints 
on governmental power, the charter prohibited poll taxes. Id. at § 23. In the area of 
criminal law, it prohibited disproportionate punishment, excessive bail, and treating 
prisoners with "unnecessary rigor." Id. at §§ 14, 13, 10. Remarkably, more than 60 
years before the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Ohio Constitution prohibited 
slavery. Id. at § 2. . 
137 During the second constitutional convention of 1851, the delegates agreed to keep 
the spirit of the declaration of rights intact: 
Resolved, that the [bill of rights] ... of the Constitution of this 
State, embracing the well settled and long established principle of 
self-government ... against the encroachments of power, and 
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since. 138 
This research demonstrates that state constitutions have their 
own unique histories and therefore must be construed independently. 
Judges confronted with such history will be less likely to treat the 
state constitution as a meaningless echo of the federal charter. In 
addition, the historical record may well establish a factual basis for 
construing the state constitution more broadly than its federal 
counterpart. 
C. Long-standing Neglect of the Ohio Constitution by State 
Court Judges 
Perhaps the greatest challenge in utilizing state constitutions 
is overcoming a judicial tradition in which state provisions are 
regarded as coextensive with their federal counterparts. This 
approach to state constitutional interpretation-dubbed the II dual II 
approach-prevails in many states, and was described earlier in this 
article. 139 It is particularly pervasive in the Midwest. 140 Once again, 
Ohio provides a good illustration of the problems posed by this 
tenacious doctrine. 
When presented with state and federal constitutional claims, 
securing to a_ll the largest liberty ... a,ccords, in its principles, with 
the cherished sentiments of the people of Ohio, and ought ... to be 
continued without material alteration as their bill of rights. 
1 J. V. SMITH, REPORT OF THE DEBATF.S AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR 
THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 1850-51, at 69 (1851; 
reprinted 1933). Thus, though the 1851 delegates streamlined the provisions and made 
some moderate textual changes, the Bill of Rights and its enduring principles of liberty 
remained intact. Perhaps the best testament to their commitment to individual liberty 
was the decision to move the Bill of Rights from Article VIII to the most prominent 
location of all: Article I, the very beginning of the document. Id. Since the 1851 
Constitution has endured to the present, the libertarian spirit that animated its drafters 
should be borne in mind by those who construe its provisions. 
138 See State v. Nieto, 131 N.E. 663, 666 (Ohio 1920) (Wanamaker, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the delegates to Ohio's second constitutional convention in 1851 
demonstrated the importance of the state Bill of Rights by moving it to the front of the 
new constitution). 
139 See supra text accompanying note 31; see also State v. Hovlat, 385 N.W.2d 436, 
447 (Neb. 1986) (Shanahan, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying note 34. 
140 Sedler, supra note 33, at 474-75. 
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Ohio courts consistently followed, until recently, the deferential 
"dual" approach. 141 This excerpt from an Ohio Supreme Court 
opinion was a typical response: 
We look to federal case law to decide the right . 
under both the state and federal provisions. The Ohio 
Constitution's guarantees . . . are substantially 
equivalent to the United States Constitution's 
guarantees. . . . [D]ecisions by the United States 
Supreme Court can be utilized to give meaning to the 
guarantees of . . . the Ohio Constitution. 142 
Scholars lambasted Ohio's "reflexive obedience to the U.S. Supreme 
Court's view, "143 its reluctance "to utilize independent state grounds 
for state constitutional decisions, "144 .its corresponding "[lack of 
expertise] in interpreting its [own] constitution, "145 and the resulting 
"fail[ure] to develop a body of state civil liberties law. "146 
In 1992, the Ohio Supreme Court simultaneously issued two 
opinions, State v. Brown141 and State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. 
Tenth District Coun of Appeals, 148 departing from the "dual" 
approach in one, and adhering to it in the other. 
In a rare display of independence, 149 the Court acknowledged 
141 See generally Mary C. Porter & Alan Tarr, The New JUdicial Federalism and the 
Ohio Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST.'L.J. 143 (1984) (showing 
several instances where the Ohio Supreme Court failed to invoke Ohio State constitution, 
and relied instead on the Federal Constitution). 
142 State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66,67 (Ohio 1980). 
143 E.g., Porter & Tarr, supra note 141, at 148. 
144 Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law in Ohio and the Nation, 16 U. ToL. 
L. REV. 391, 402-03 (1985). 
145 Porter & Tarr, supra note 141, at 15.4. 
146 Id. 
147 588 N.E.2d 113 (Ohio 1992). 
148 588 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1992). 
149 On only one previous occasion had a majority of the Ohio Court expressly 
recognized its power to depart from U.S. Supreme Court precedent when interpreting 
analogous provisions of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Chatton, 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1241 
n.4 (Ohio 1984) (dictum) ("[N]onetheless, even should a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule be recognized for Fourth Amendment purposes, the question remains 
whether we would likewise recognize such an exception under Section 14, Article I of 
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in Brown that it is free to deviate from U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent when interpreting analogous provisions of the Ohio 
Constitution. iso And, for the first time, the Ohio Supreme Court 
actually did depart from U.S. Supreme Court precedent, holding that 
Article I, § 14 of the Ohio Constitution affords greater protection 
against unreasonable search and seizure than the Federal Fourth 
Amendment. 1s1 The Court's decision was unanimous. 1s2 
Brown's impact remains uncertain, however, because Rear 
Door Bookstore, issued the same day, expressly rejects the notion that 
Ohio's free speech clause is any broader than the Federal First 
the Ohio Constitution."). 
150 Brown, 588 N.E.2d at 115 n.3. 
151 Id. at 114 n.1. 
152 In Brown, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the permissible scope of an 
automobile search incident to arrest, under both the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions. The 
criminal defendant, Henry Brown, had been stopped for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. Brown was arrested and placed in custody in a patrol car. After confining 
Brown in the patrol car, the officer searched the passenger compartment of Brown's 
automobile. During the course of this search, the officer opened a small unlocked 
container in which he found LSD. Id. at 116. Brown was indicted on one count of drug 
possession of LSD. His lawyer filed a motion to suppress the LSD found in his car, 
arguing that this evidence was obtained by means of an unconstitutional search. Id. at 
114. In determining the constitutionality of this search, the Ohio Supreme Court was 
faced with a U.S. Supreme Court precedent, New Yorkv. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), 
which greatly expanded the permissible scope, under the Fourth Amendment, of 
automobile searches incident to arrest. In Be/Jon, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically 
recognized that it is permissible for an officer-after arresting the occupants of an 
automobile and leading them away from the car-to return to the car and search its 
contents, including any closed containers he may find. Id. at 455-56, 462. In Brown, 
the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the general applicability of Be/Jon, but identified 
certain distinguishing facts. 588 N .E.2d at 115. The Court acknowledged that these 
distinguishing facts made it unclear whether the search of Brown's automobile was 
permissible under Be/Jon. Noting that it was free to construe the Ohio Constitution as 
imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than that imposed by the U.S. 
Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically held that it would decline to follow 
Be/Jon insofar as it authorized the type of search performed in Brown's car, "If Be/Jon 
does stand for the proposition that a police officer may conduct a detailed search of an 
automobile solely because he has arrested one of its occupants, on any charge, we 
decline to adopt its rule." Id. at 352 (second emphasis added). In so holding, the Ohio 
Supreme Court expressly recognized that it is free to depart from U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent in construing analogous provisions of the Ohio Constitution. More important, 
the Ohio Supreme Court for the first time specifically departed from U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent in construing a counterpart provision in the Ohio Constitution. 
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Amendment: "Appellants have cited no Ohio case, nor has our 
research discovered any authority, for the proposition that the free 
speech guarantees accorded by the Ohio Constitution are broader than 
those provided under the United States Constitution. "153 In so 
holding, the Court issued a rebuke to those who would advocate a 
broader reading of the Ohio Constitution: "We have no reluctance in 
declining to follow New York's dubious leadership to enlarge Ohio's 
Constitutional protections [for free speech] to encompass the activities 
occurring within the Rear Door Bookstore. "154 
Taken together, these decisions offer both hope and 
discouragement to those who would invoke the Ohio Constitution as 
a supplemental source of protection for reproductive freedom. 155 
Though recent decisions by lower courts evince a strong willingness 
153 Rear Door Bookstore, 588 N.E.2d at 123-24. 
ISi Id. at 124. 
15
.s Rear Door Bookstore's impact is limited somewhat by the fact that it was not 
actually authored by any justice of the Ohio Supreme Court. Instead, the opinion is that 
of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which the Ohio Supreme Court merely affirmed 
and published as an appendix to its one-sentence order. Rear Door Bookstore, 588 
N.E.2d at 117. Moreover, under Ohio law, only the syllabus "states the controlling point 
or points of law decided." OHIO SUP. CT. R. l(B). The Supreme Court's syllabus in 
Rear Door Bookstore contains no reference to the appellate court's restrictive 
interpretation of Ohio's free speech clause. Moreover, in a more recent decision, the 
Ohio Supreme Court appeared to recognize that Ohio's provision is slightly broader than 
the Federal First Amendment: 
The freedoms of speech, press, religion and assembly are guaranteed 
together in the First Amendment because they share a core value: 
the freedom of an individual to frame his thoughts and beliefs. The 
Constitution of Ohio is even more specific; it guarantees to every 
citizen freedom to 'speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all 
subjects.' It follows that a citizen of Ohio is free to have 'sentiments 
on all subjects.' 
State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 457 (Ohio 1992) (quoting OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11) 
(emphasis added)), vacated on Federal Constitutional grounds, 113 S.Ct. 2954 (1993). 
Accord Urbana ex rel. Newlin v. Downing, 539 N.E.2d 140, 153 (Ohio 1989) (Brown, 
J., dissenting) (the state constitutional right to freedom of speech is broader than the 
federal right and "authorize[s] the expression of any sentiment on any subject so long as 
the expression does not cause harm") (emphasis in original). Thus, there exists at least 
some fragile authority for asserting that Ohio's free speech clause is not merely 
coextensive with its federal counterpart. 
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to breathe life into the Ohio Constitution, 156 the state supreme court 
has in recent months continued its halting, inconsistent approach to 
interpreting the state charter. 157 
These decisions show that efforts to develop the state 
constitution are generating considerable agitation in Ohio's courts. 
The next few years will be critical in determining whether 
conservative states like Ohio join the growing number of jurisdictions 
where state constitutions are enjoying a renaissance. 158 
D. Breathing Life into State Constitutional Provisions Long 
Overshadowed by Their Federal Counterparts 
This article will now demonstrate how state guarantees of 
liberty, privacy, equal protection, and free speech may be used in 
challenging abortion restrictions of the sort upheld in Casey. 
1. Liberty/Privacy 
Casey-type restrictions violate state constitutional guarantees 
of liberty and privacy by abridging the bodily integrity and personal 
u6 See, e.g., Ferner v. Toledo-Lucas County Convention & Visitor's Bureau, Inc., 
610 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Ohio Ct. App.) (holding that the state free speech clause is 
broader than the Federal First Amendment); Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio 
C.P. May 27, 1992) (striking down abortion restrictions under liberty, equal protection, 
free speech, and freedom of conscience guarantees in the Ohio Constitution). 
157 Compare Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 68 Ohio St. 3d 221 (Ohio 1994) 
(holding that the free speech clause of the Ohio Constitution affords no greater access 
to shopping malls for speech activities than the Federal First Amendment) and State v. 
Wyant, 68 Ohio St. 3d 162 (Ohio 1994) (holding that the state free speech clause 
imposes no greater restrictions on legislative power to enact "ethnic intimidation" statutes 
than does the Federal First Amendment) with Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 
42 (Ohio 1993) (asserting that "the Ohio Constitution is a document of independent 
force," which may be construed to afford greater protection for civil liberties than the 
U.S. Constitution). Dissenting in Slanco, Justice Craig Wright criticized the Court's 
inconsistency in construing the state charter, observing that "this court has taken one step 
forward but two steps backward in recent cases involving the interpretation of the Ohio 
Constitution." 68 Ohio St. 3d at 225. 
158 See supra notes 42-72 and accompanying text. 
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autonomy of women, and by placing undue burdens on the capacity 
of women to make procreative and medical decisions free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion. Before turning to an analysis 
of the liberty and privacy guarantees under the Ohio Constitution, let 
us first examine how such provisions have been employed in other 
jurisdictions. 
a. In Other Jurisdictions, Courts Have Found Enhanced 
Protection for Reproductive Freedom in State Constitutional 
Guarantees of Liberty and Privacy 
In some jurisdictions, courts have found enhanced protection 
for reproductive freedom in state constitutional guarantees of liberty 
and privacy. In California159 and Florida, 160 the courts relied upon 
express privacy guarantees contained in their state constitutions. 161 
In New Jersey162 and Connecticut, 163 the courts found an implied 
159 Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981) 
(applying strict scrutiny in finding that the challenged regulation unduly burdened a 
woman's fundamental right of privacy). · 
160 In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (applying strict scrutiny in finding that 
the challenged regulation unduly burdened a woman's fundamental right of privacy). 
161 Some state constitutions expressly guarantee a right of privacy. See e.g., ALASKA 
CONST. art. I,§ 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II,§ 8; CAL. CONST. art. I,§ l; 0. C. CONST. art. 
I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; L.A. CONST. art. I, § 5; and 
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. 
162 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982). In Byrne, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court struck down a state Medicaid funding scheme which subsidized only life-
saving abortions and excluded medically necessary abortions. Id. at 932. The court first 
noted the "more expansive" liberty grant under its state charter: "All persons are by 
nature free and independent, and have certain natural and inalienable rights, among 
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and 
protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." N.J. CONST. 
art. I, § 1. The court concluded, "[b]y declaring the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of safety and happiness, [the provision] protects the right of privacy, a right that was 
implicit in the 1844 Constitution." Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 933. The court then 
observed that this state right to privacy had been invoked to protect adult consensual 
sexual conduct, the right to sterilization, and the right to terminate life support. Id. A 
common theme running through these cases was the precept that sometimes "an 
individual's right to control her own body and life overrides the state's general interest 
in preserving life." Id. Accordingly, the court deemed the right to privacy, and the 
right of "all pregnant women" to choose abortion, fundamental. Id. at 934. The court 
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noted that the choice to abort was "one of the most intimate decisions in human 
experience ... that should be made by the woman in consultation with a few trusted 
advisors, such as her doctor, without undue government interference." Id. Since the 
funding restriction implicated a fundamental right, the court employed a strict scrutiny 
analysis. The court determined that the statute violated an indigent woman's 
"fundamental right to control her body and destiny" by withholding funds for medically 
necessary abortions. Id. at 933. 
163 Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. 1986). In Maher, the Connecticut Superior 
Court struck down a Medicaid funding scheme which funded only abortions necessary 
to save the life of the mother. The court held that Connecticut's implied right of privacy 
included the right to preserve one's health and the right to choose an abortion. Id. at 
150-53. To determine the source of the right, the court looked to the state constitution: 
"The preamble ... reserves to the people 'the liberties, rights and privileges which they 
have derived from their ancestors'; and the preface clause to the declaration of rights . 
. . . broadly incorporates the concept of ordered liberty by stating '[t)hat the great and 
essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and established. 
. . . '" Id. In construing this expansive language, the court reasoned that the framers 
of the 1818 Constitution intended that "the right of privacy is implicitly guaranteed under 
our state charter of liberty." Id. The court noted that its state constitution not only 
constrained governmental power, but also conferred positive rights upon the people. Id. 
While some positive rights were enumerated, "others were implied ... in the preamble 
of the Constitution and that of the declaration of rights; and all are guaranteed by the due 
process clause." Id. Among these implied rights were fundamental or "'natural rights,' 
which the people took for granted as being deeply rooted in the core of liberty." Id. at 
150-53. The court cited one framer's conception of natural rights as "'the enjoyment 
and exercise of a power to do as we think proper, without any other restraint than what 
results from the law of nature, or what may be denominated the moral law.'" Id. at 
149. In passing, the court noted that while natural rights analysis may be in disrepute 
today, it is highly useful in determining the intent of the framers. Id. at 149 n.32. 
Next, the court discerned the nature of fundamental rights. Such rights are inherently 
rooted in "'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our 
civil and political institutions."' Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 
(1932)). Citing the famous dissent of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438 (1928), the court concluded that "the right to be let alone is fundamental and 
this right of privacy is older than the Bill of Rights." Maher, 515 A.2d at 150. 
Accordingly, the court concluded: "It is absolutely clear that the right of privacy is 
implicit in Connecticut's ordered liberty." Id. The court went on to describe the 
privacy right in expansive terms. It stated unequivocally that the privacy right secured 
a woman's exercise of procreative freedom: "If the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual . . . to be free of unwarranted government intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child." Id. (quoting Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685 
(1977)). Also, like the court in Right 10 Choose, 450 A.2d at 934, the Maher court 
stated that privacy shields the physician-patient relationship from undue governmental 
interference. Privacy "encompasses the doctor-patient relationship regarding the 
woman's health, including the physician's right to advise the woman on the abortion 
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privacy right in the sweeping liberty guarantees set forth in their state 
constitutions. Likewise, courts in Massachusetts, 164 New York, 16s and 
decision based upon her well-being." Maher, 515 A.2d at 150. Finally, the court 
deemed as fundamental "the right to make decisions which are necessary for the 
preservation and protection of one's health." Id. If not within the ambit of privacy, this 
right is free-standing and fundamental, for "at every stage of pregnancy, the woman's 
health is paramount." Id. at 150. Both the New Jersey and Connecticut courts found 
an implicit right to privacy within the expansive liberty. provisions of their state charters. 
Both courts suggested that the privacy right was so "fundamental to the concept of 
ordered liberty" that it need not be enumerated expressly. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 152 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
164 Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981). In Moe, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated a state Medicaid funding scheme that 
subsidized only abortions to save the mother's life. The funding scheme violated an 
implicit privacy right stemming from the state constitution's due process clause. Id. at 
402. The court held that due process requires governmental restraint in interfering with 
the positive right to privacy. First, the court embraced the holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973): "Although we are not unaware of the criticism leveled at Roe, we have 
accepted the formulation of rights that it announced as an integral part of our 
jurisprudence." Id. at 398. The court explained that the privacy right shielding family, 
sexuality, and reproductive freedom is "but one aspect of a far broader grant" of 
personal autonomy. Id. This autonomy right demands that '"the sanctity of individual 
free choice"' and the freedom of '"bodily integrity"' be fundamental. Id. at 399 (quoting 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass: 1977)). To protect the 
right to privacy, due process requires nonintervention by the state. The court had twice 
defended a woman's right to choose abortion on state constitutional grounds. Moe, 417 
N .E.2d at 398. These Massachusetts cases respect a "'private realm of family life which 
the state cannot enter."' Id. at 398-99 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944)). '"We would not order either a husband or a wife to do what is necessary 
to conceive a child or to prevent conception, any more than we would order either party 
... to make the other happy. Some things must be left to private agreement."' Id. at 
398 (quoting Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974)). The Massachusetts court, 
noting that the due process guarantees in its state constitution provided more protection 
than the federal analogue, concluded that the state due process clause '"forbids the state 
to interpose material obstacles to the effectuation of a woman's counseled decision to 
terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester."' Id. at 398-99 (quoting Framingham 
v. Southborough, 367 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1977)). The court further explained that 
governmental regulations impinging on the right to privacy must be neutral to satisfy due 
process. Id. at 400. "[O]nce [the legislature] chooses to enter the constitutionally 
protected area of choice, it must do so with genuine indifference." Id. at 402. 
Accordingly, the court determined that the exclusion of medically necessary abortions 
from the Medicaid scheme was impermissibly discriminatory and that the woman's 
exercise of her right to choose abortion outweighed the state's interest in protecting fetal 
life. Id. 
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West Virginia166 relied upon substantive due process guarantees in 
their state constitutions. 
165 Hopev. Perales, 571N.Y.S.2d972 (Sup. Ct. 1991), ajf'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 
(App. Div. 1993), dismissed, 601 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. 1993). In Hope, a New York 
trial court struck down a complete ban on funded abortions through the state Prenatal 
Care Assistance Program for indigent women. The court held that the funding 
restriction was "contrary to the constitutional right to privacy guaranteed by the due 
process clause of the New York State Constitution." Id. at 976-77. New York's due 
process clause, providing that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law," N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, had historically been construed as 
granting broader protection than its federal counterpart. Hope, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 978. 
The court noted that since the clause was enacted prior to the Federal Fourteenth 
Amendment and had distinct language, an independent construction was appropriate. Id. 
The court acknowledged that New York decriminalized abortion three years before Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), "to recognize that the state had no right to interfere with 
the most personal and important decision a woman can make regarding her body and her 
life." Id. at 976. Like the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the New York court 
stressed the importance of governmental noninterference with the right to privacy: 
In constitutional terms, the right to privacy involves freedom of 
choice, the broad general right to make decisions concerning one's 
self and to conduct one's self in accordance with those decisions free 
of governmental restraint or interference. . . . The essence of this 
freedom is the absence of governmental interference in the personal 
decisions concerning contraception, procreation, and abortion, to 
name a few that fall within the ambit of ... privacy. 
Id. at 977. The court found that the funding ban unduly interfered with the right of 
indigent women to choose abortion. By excluding all funding of abortion, the prenatal 
care program "impermissibly pressures· an eligible indigent woman toward childbirth, 
abridging a constitutionally protected right." Id. at 979. The discriminatory program 
allowing health care only for childbirth expenses "effectively precludes an eligible 
woman from any real choice in the fundamental decision 'to bear or beget a child."' Id. 
(quoting Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977)). In 
addition, the regulation "wrests control from the pregnant woman over her body and 
health." Id. at 980. The court ruled that the regulation was not "fairly, justly, 
reasonably, or rationally related to the promotion of the health, comfort, safety, and 
welfare of society." Id. at 978. Thus, the court extended the reach of the implicit 
privacy right to include "the right of a pregnant woman to choose an abortion where it 
is medically indicated." Id. 
166 Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Panepinto, 1993 WL 522706 (W. Va. Dec. 20, 
1993) (striking down restrictions on public funding of abortion under substantive due 
process and equal protection theories advanced under the West Virginia Constitution). 
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b. Ohio's Constitution Affords Heightened Protection for 
Reproductive Freedom Under Guarantees of Liberty and Privacy 
i. Textual Analysis 
The U.S. Constitution mentions liberty only in the context of 
due process: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . . "167 By 
contrast, the Ohio Constitution confers a sweeping grant of individual 
liberty: "All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have 
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety. "168 
Since the liberty right guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution 
is neither tied to nor limited by a due process clause, it may be 
deemed to provide greater substantive protection for all Ohio citizens 
than that afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Since it is liberty that 
forms the very foundation of reproductive freedom,169 and since the 
liberty clause of the Ohio Constitution is broader than that of the 
U.S. Constitution, Ohio's liberty guarantee may be viewed as 
providing heightened protection for reproductive autonomy. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court construed an identical 
provision in its state constitution as granting a fundamental privacy 
right. 170 The Connecticut court likewise relied upon similar language 
in its constitution to find that privacy is implicit in that State's 
ordered liberty. 171 More important, those courts found that the broad 
language of the liberty guarantees in their state constitutions created 
167 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
168 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
169 Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 216 (1991) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
Id. 
Roe v. Wade and its progeny are not so much about a medical 
procedure as they are about a woman's fundamental right to self-
determination. Those cases serve to vindicate the idea that 'liberty,' 
if it means anything, must entail freedom from governmental 
domination in making the most intimate and personal of decisions. 
170 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 937 (1982). See supra note 162. 
171 Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 148-49 (Conn. 1986). See supra note 163. 
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greater protection for reproductive freedom than that afforded by 
federal law. Since Ohio's liberty provision is expressed in similarly 
broad language, it too should be deemed to confer greater protection 
for reproductive freedom than that supplied by the Federal 
Constitution. 
ii. Application to Casey-type Provisions 
The foregoing textual analysis, coupled with the historical 
perspective outlined above, 172 demonstrates that the Ohio Constitution 
was animated by a powerful libertarian spirit, and that it contains a 
sweeping guarantee of liberty. Moreover, Ohio's liberty provision 
affords greater protection than that contained in the Federal 
Constitution, and its sweeping language embraces an implied right of 
privacy. 
In fact, Ohio courts have recognized a constitutional right to 
privacy under the liberty guarantee in Article I, § 1, of the Ohio 
Constitution. An Ohio trial court enjoined a school board regulation 
governing dress codes and hair-length restrictions which "invad[ed] 
the privacy and dignity of the student . . . in the most intimate and 
personal way. "173 Turning to Article I, § 1, the court noted: "It 
seems . . . strikingly important that our founding fathers placed this 
section first in the Bill of Rights. It represents the embodiment of 
what this nation stands for. It enshrines in our Constitution our 
dedication to individual freedom and dignity. "174 The court then 
identified a broad right of individual privacy: 
In non-legal terms, Section 1 establishes the principle 
that every American has the right to be let alone and 
to be regulated by the government only so far as such 
regulation is shown to be necessary to protect others 
or to advance legitimate governmental purposes. This 
constitutional provision places a heavy responsibility 
172 See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text. 
173 Jacobs v. Benedict, 301 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ohio C.P. 1973); aff'd, 316 N.E.2d 
898 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973). 
174 Id. at 725. 
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on any governmental body to justify its interference 
with a citizen's freedom, his right to enjoy liberty of 
decision and to seek happiness in his own way .175 
45 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the regulation was "antithetical 
to our American tradition of rugged individualism and wholly 
repugnant to the laws and Constitution of Ohio. "176 
This opinion, later affirmed, 177 offers some lessons on the 
interpretation of Article I, § 1. The court first looked at the text and 
discerned the intent of the framers by placing the provision first in 
the Constitution and first in the Bill of Rights. 178 The court 
recognized the principles of individual dignity and autonomy that 
animate Ohio's Constitution in declaring a fundamental right to 
privacy. The court formulated a standard to justify governmental 
interference: the intrusion must be necessary to advance a legitimate 
state purpose. This formulation, with its emphasis upon necessity, is 
closely akin to the "strict scrutiny" standard in federal constitutional 
jurisprudence. 179 This is the sort of independent interpretation that 
state courts should be encouraged to pursue when construing their 
own constitutions. 
In the intervening years, Ohio courts have held that the 
protection of personal privacy covers those areas which are 
"'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' 
[involving] matters related to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, and child-rearing and education. "180 They have 
noted that "the family unit, which performs the social function of 
child-rearing, regardless of its composition, . . . is constitutionally 
protected against governmental intrusion not supported by a 
compelling state interest. "181 Likewise, Ohio courts have held that 
175 Id. at 725 (emphasis added). 
176 Id. at 728. 
177 Jacobs, 316 N .E.2d at 901. 
178 Jacobs, 301 N.E.2d at 725. 
179 Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) and Sugarman v. Dougall, 
413 U.S. 634 (1973) with Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). 
180 Wilson v. Patton, 551 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
181 Saunders v. Clark County Zoning Dep't, 421 N.E.2d 152, 155-56 (Ohio 1981). 
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adult, consensual sexual conduct done in private is protected, 182 and 
that "the choice not to procreate, as part of one's privacy, has 
become (subject to certain limitations) a Constitutional guarantee. "183 
These cases demonstrate that the Ohio Constitution contains 
an implied right of privacy affording protection for reproductive 
freedom. An opinion of the Ohio Attorney General has confirmed 
that such a privacy right exists. 184 Though never previously invoked 
in the context of abortion regulations, Ohio's right to privacy is 
sufficiently broad to protect women from the unwarranted 
governmental intrusion that Casey-type provisions represent. 
2. Equal Protection185 
Such restrictions also violate constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection because they impose burdens upon women's reproductive 
choices that are not imposed upon the reproductive choices of men, 
because they perpetuate myths and stereotypes that demean women 
and hinder their ability to participate fully and equally in society, and 
because they deprive women, but not men, of a fundamental right. 
Unfettered freedom of choice regarding abortion "is central 
to a woman's control not only of her own body, but also to the 
control of her social role and personal destiny. "186 "The implications 
of an unwanted child for a woman's education, employment 
opportunities, and associational opportunities (often including 
182 City of Columbus v. Scott, 353 N.E.2d 858 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
183 Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 469, 499 (Ohio 1976). 
184 Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-095, at n.3, 1982 Ohio AG LEXIS 14 (Nov. 15, 
1982). 
185 This section of the article, though intended primarily to support state 
constitutional cliams, is applicable in part to equal protection claims under the Federal 
Constitution. See infra notes 238-60 and accompanying text. 
186 Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term: Toward Equal Citizenship 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. l, 57-58 (1977); see Committee 
to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 792 (Cal. 1981) (striking down 
abortion funding restrictions on state liberty, privacy, and equal protection grounds). 
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marriage opportunities) are of enormous proportion. "187 
If a man is the involuntary source of a child-if he is 
forbidden, for example, to practice contraception-the 
violation of his personality is profound. But if a 
woman is forced to bear a child-not simply to 
provide an ovum but to carry the child to term-the 
invasion is incalculably greater. . . . [I]t is difficult 
to imagine a clearer case of bodily intrusion, even if 
the original conception was in some sense 
voluntary .188 
47 
In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he ability 
of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the 
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their 
reproductive lives. "189 Thus, when a statute imposes burdens upon 
women's reproductive choices that are not imposed upon the 
reproductive choices of men, that statute violates principles of equal 
protection: 
[I]t might be possible to discern an invidious 
discrimination against women, or at least a 
constitutionally problematic subordination of women, 
in the law's very indifference to the biological reality 
that sometimes requires them, but never requires 
[men], to resort to abortion procedures if they are to 
avoid pregnancy and childbearing. 190 
Equal protection challenges to direct restrictions on abortion have 
rarely been attempted. Though challenges to abortion fending 
187 Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 641 
n.90 (1980). See Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 793 
(Cal. 1981). 
188 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 15-10, at 1340 (2d. ed. 
1988), 
. 
189 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
190 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 244 (1985) (cited in Doe v. Maher, 
515 A.2d 134, 160 (Conn. 1986) (striking down abortion funding restrictions on state 
constitutional liberty, privacy, and equal protection grounds)). 
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limitations have been pursued-unsuccessfully under the Federal 
Constitution, 191 but with great success under state constitutions192-
equal protection arguments have only recently been directed at Casey-
type provisions. 193 This article will turn first to the abortion funding 
cases, examining how state equal protection guarantees can be more 
potent than their federal counterpart in restraining governmental 
interference with abortion. 194 I will show that the heightened equal 
protection scrutiny embodied in the funding cases applies just as 
readily to Casey-type restrictions. 195 Next, I will explore how to 
proceed with state court judges who are not inclined to read their 
191 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that the government can 
constitutionally refuse to fund medically-necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464 (1977) (holding that states can constitutionally refuse to furnish Medicaid financing 
for non-therapeutic abortions, even while making Medicaid funding available for 
childbirth expenses). 
I'll Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 784 (Cal. 1981) 
(invoking the California Constitution's express right to privacy); Doe v. Maher, 515 
A.2d 134 (Conn. 1986) (invoking the equal protection and liberty provisions of the 
Connecticut Constitution); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (invoking the 
Florida Constitution's express privacy guarantee); Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 417 
N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981) (recognizing an implied right to privacy in the substantive due 
process guarantees in the Massachusetts Constitution); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 
A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982) (recognizing an implied right to privacy in the New Jersey 
Constitution's liberty guarantee, and invoking the state equal protection clause); Hope 
v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (invoking both the liberty and equal 
protection provisions of the New York Constitution), a.ff'd, 595 N. Y.S.2d 948 (App. 
Div. 1993), dismissed, 601N.Y.S.2d568 (N.Y. 1993); Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc. 
v. Department of Human Resources, 663 P. 2d 1247 (Or. 1983) (invoking the privileges 
and immunities clause of the Oregon Constitution); Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. 
Panepinto, 1993 WL 522706 (W. Va. Dec., 17, 1993) (invoking equal protection and 
substantive due process guarantees under the West Virginia Constitution). A similar 
lawsuit was recently filed in Florida. Doe v. State, No. CL-93-2022-AJ (Fla. Cir. Ct.) 
(complaint filed March 1993) (invoking the state's express guarantees of privacy and 
equal protection in challenging a scheme that denies state Medicaid coverage for 
medically necessary abortions but funds childbirth expenses). But see Fischer v. 
Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985) (rejecting state equal protection 
and state equal rights theories). 
193 Voinovich, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio C.P. Ct. May 27, 1992) (striking 
down a mandatory 24-hour delay and biased counseling provisions under the state equal 
protection clause), id. at 15, 28 (relying as well upon the Federal Equal Protection 
Cla11se). 
194 See infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text. 
195 See infra notes 208-37 and accompanying text. 
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equal protection clauses so broadly. I will demonstrate that it may 
be possible to invalidate Casey-type provisions even under a state 
equal protection clause that is deemed coextensive with the federal 
guarantee. 196 
a. In Several Jurisdictions, Courts Have Found Enhanced 
Protection for Reproducti.ve Freedom in State Consti.tuti.onal 
Guarantees of Equal Protection 
Relying upon equal protection guarantees in their 
state197constitutions, courts in New Jersey, 198 West Virginia,199 
Connecticut,200 New York,201 and California202 struck down laws that 
burdened a woman's capacity to obtain an abortion.203 These cases, 
196 See infra notes 238-60 and accompanying text. 
1!17 The vast majority of state constitutions contain an equal protection guarantee: 
ALA. CONST. art. I, § l; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § l; ARiz. CONST; art. II, § 13; ARK. 
CONST. art. II, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29; CONN. 
CONST. art. I,§ 20; FLA. CONST. art. I,§ 2; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2; HAW. CONST. art. 
I, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2; IND. CONST. art. I, § 23; 
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6; KAN. CONST. BlLL OF R.IOHTS, § 2; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; 
ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 46; MASS. 
CONST. part 1, art. I; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2; MONT. 
CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H. CONST. art I, art. II; N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 18; N.Y. 
CONST. art. I, § 11; N.C. CONST. art. l, § 19; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2; OR. CONST. 
art. I, § 20; PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3; 
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a; VA. CONST. art. I,§ 11; WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 12; W.VA. CONST. art. III, § l; and WYO. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
198 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934-37 (N.J. 1982). 
199 Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Panepinto, No. 21924 (W. Va. Dec. 17, 1993). 
200 Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 157-62 (Conn. 1986) (relying on both the state 
equal protection clause and the state equal rights amendment). 
201 Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 981-82 (Sup. Ct. 1991), ajf'd, 595 
N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1993), dismissed, 601N.Y.S.2d568 (N.Y. 1993). 
202 Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 789 (Cal. 1981) 
(employing an "unconstitutional conditions" analysis developed under the state 
constitution, the California Supreme Court held that statutory provisions which 
"discriminatorily deny" generally available medical benefits to poor women solely 
because they choose to have an abortion are invalid). 
203 But see Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985) 
(rejecting state equal protection and state equal rights amendment theories in a challenge 
to abortion funding restrictions); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 
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which form part of a larger trend in state equal protection 
litigation, 204 all involved restrictions on public funding of abortion. 
The New York court endorsed plaintiffs' argument that "the 
right to choose . . . abortion is a fundamental precondition of a 
woman's exercise of equality under the law and [by restricting 
abortion] the state controls and alters the lives of women in a way 
that it does not control and alter the lives of men. "205 The 
Connecticut court concluded: "Since only women become pregnant, 
discrimination against pregnancy by not funding abortion when it is 
medically necessary and when all other medical expenses are paid by 
the state for both men and women is sex-oriented discrimination. 11206 
In striking down a similar program, the California Supreme 
Court observed: 
[W]e cannot characterize the statutory scheme as 
merely providing a public benefit which the individual 
. . . is free to accept or refuse without any 
impairment of her constitutional rights. [T]he state is 
utilizing its resources to ensure that women who are 
too poor to obtain medical care on their own will 
exercise their right of procreative choice only in the 
1992) (rejecting state equal protection, freedom-of-religion, and establishment-of-religion 
claims in a challenge to abortion access restrictions). 
204 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (recognizing, in 
dictum, that the state equal protection clause may confer a right to same-sex marriages); 
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (striking down the state's 
sodomy law on the grounds that it violated the state constitution's right to privacy and 
equal protection and expressly rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive privacy and 
equal protection analysis in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
205 Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 981 (Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 
948 (App. Div. 1993), dismissed, 601N.Y.S.2d568 (N.Y. 1993). The court concluded 
that "[w]hile the Legislature can express a preference for childbirth over abortion and 
allocate resources accordingly, it cannot transgress constitutional principles to achieve 
this result." Id. at 979. Thus, the court struck down the abortion funding restrictions 
on state equal protection grounds. Id. at 981-82. 
206 Doe·v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 159 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (emphasis added). 
Echoing this analysis, an Oregon court concluded: "It may well be that if the medical 
assistance program is a comprehensive one providing all medically necessary services 
for men but not for women if those services involve an abortion, the program denies 
equal privileges to women because they are women." Planned Parenthood v. 
Department of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 1247, 1260 (Or. Ct. App. 1983). 
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manner approved by the state. 207 
b. The Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny Employed in Some 
States to Invalidate Abortion Funding Restrictions Applies Just as 
Readily to Casey-type Provisions. . 
In each of the foregoing cases, state equal protection clauses 
were construed to prevent the government from placing unequal 
burdens on the reproductive freedom of men and women. Though 
each case involved public funding of abortion, the rationale is equally 
applicable to Casey-type restrictions. In both . contexts, the 
government is placing burdens on the reproductive choices of women 
that are not imposed on the reproductive choices of men. These four 
cases exemplify the diversity of approaches employed by state courts 
in construing their equal protection guarantees. 
In Hope v. Perales, the New York court employed an 
approach that bears the closest resemblance to federal equal 
protection analysis. 208 It. held that "[i]f a statute burdens a 
'fundamental interest' or employs a 'suspect' classification, it must 
withstand strict scrutiny. 11209 Echoing the federal standard, the court 
observed that in order to survive strict scrutiny, the statute must be 
"necessary to promote a compelling state interest and narrowly 
tailored to achieve that purpose. "210 But the New York court parted 
company wiµt federal law in deCiaring access to medically prescribed 
abortions a "fundamental right, "211 and, consequently, it employed 
2D1 Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 793 (Cal. 1981) 
(emphasis added). 
208 See Hope, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 981. 
20'J Id. at 981. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. Casey leaves considerable doubt whether abortion may be regarded as a 
"fundamental right" under the Federal Constitution. See 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (plurality 
opinion) (adopting a new "undue burden" standard by which strict scrutiny will be 
applied only to those regulations that impose "a substantial obstacle to the woman's 
exercise of the right to choose"). "Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all 
governmental attempts to influence a woman's decision on behalf of the potential life 
within her as unwarranted. This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the 
recognition that there is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout 
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strict scrutiny to invalidate the challenged limitation on abortion 
funding. 212 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized the same strict 
scrutiny standard for equal protection violations that burden suspect 
classes and fundamental rights. 213 The court announced, however, 
that mid-level scrutiny under New Jersey's equal protection clause is 
more exacting than that under the federal charter: "[W]here an 
important personal right is affected by governmental action, the [New 
Jersey Supreme] Court often requires the public authority to 
demonstrate a greater 'public need' than is traditionally required in 
construing the Federal Constitution. i'214 Standing by itself, this 
heightened standard would represent an encouraging prospect for 
gender-discrimination claims. But the New Jersey court held that 
freedom of choice is a.fundamental right,215 and therefore employed 
strict scrutiny in striking down the funding limitation. 216 
Thus, the New York and New Jersey decisions demonstrate 
that equal protection challenges to abortion regulations may be 
successfully pursued under state constitutions if the court can be 
persuaded that freedom of choice is a fundamental right. The New 
Jersey decision suggests, moreover, that victory may be possible 
without the benefit of a strict scrutiny standard. Even if the court 
refuses to recognize abortion as a fundamental right, its mid-level 
scrutiny may be sufficiently exacting to invalidate abortion 
regulations. Finally, these· decisions need not be confined to the 
pregnancy." Id. at 2818. Conspicuously absent from the plurality opinion was any 
reference to freedom of choice as a "fundamental" right. Justice Blackmun likewise 
avoided any talk of "fundamental" rights, emphasizing instead the need for reconciling 
"the liberty of the woman and the interest of the State in promoting prenatal life .... " 
Id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
212 Hope, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 981-82. 
213 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (N.J. 1982). 
214 Id. at 936 (emphasis added) (quoting Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Township. 
v. Weymouth Township., 364 A.2d 1016, 1036 (N.J. 1976)). 
215 Byrne, 450 A.2d at 934 (holding that the right to choose to have an abortion is 
a fundamental right of all pregnant women). 
216 Id. at 936 ("The statute affects the right of poor pregnant women to choose 
between alternative necessary medical services. No compelling state interest justifies 
that discrimination, and the statute denies equal protection to those exercising their 
constitutional right to choose a medically necessary abortion.") (emphasis added). 
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abortion funding context; their sweeping recognition that legislative 
obstacles to abortion impose a discriminatory burden on women is 
broad enough to implicate Casey-type restrictions as well. 
The California Supreme Court employed a very different 
analysis in striking down a scheme of funding restrictions. 
Employing an "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine developed under 
the state's equal protection clause, the court 'invalidated the 
restrictions because they "discriminatorily den[ied]" medical benefits 
to poor women who were merely trying to exercise their freedom to 
choose an abortion. 217 This "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, 
which essentially holds that a citizen cannot be penalized by the 
government for exercising a constitutional right,218 will not apply as 
readily to Casey-type restrictions. The doctrine has been developed 
exclusively in the context of receiving public benefits conditioned 
"on the waiver or forfeiture of [various] constitutional rights. "219 
This does not mean, however, that an equal protection claim against 
Casey-type restrictions is destined for failure under the California 
Constitution. It merely means that the "unconstitutional conditions" 
doctrine will not likely apply in such a case. Similar claims advanced 
in New York and New Jersey would be available. 
Finally, the Connecticut case holds out a special promise for 
those states whose constitutions contain an equal rights amendment 
("ERA"). The court struck down abortion funding restrictions not 
only under its equal protection clause, 220 but also, separately, under 
its ERA.221 Like the New York and New Jersey decisions discussed 
above, the Connecticut court employed a strict scrutiny standard 
under its equal protection clause after holding that the regulation 
infringed upon a "fundamental right. "222 The court further observed 
that the women challenging this scheme had an even stronger case 
217 Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 799 (Cal. 1981). 
218 Id. at 796. 
219 Id. at 797 (applying the doctrine to an area normally reserved for equal protection 
analysis). 
220 Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 158-59 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986). 
221 Id. at 159-60. The court also invalidated the funding restrictions under a separate 
liberty/privacy analysis. See id. at 146-57. 
222 Id. at 159. 
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under Connecticut's ERA.223 
In pursuing its ERA analysis, the Connecticut court observed: 
By adopting the ERA, the "people of this state and 
their legislators have unambiguously indicated an 
intent to abolish sex discrimination." . . . Since time 
immemorial, women's biology and ability to bear 
children have been used as a basis for discrimination 
against them. . . . This discrimination has had a 
devastating effect upon women. 224 
The court asserted .that the framers of Connecticut's ERA intended 
that "pregnancy discrimination would come within the [amendment's] 
purview ... should be subject to heightened judicial review. "225 The 
court concluded: "In sum, by adopting the ERA, Connecticut 
determined that the state should no longer be permitted to 
disadvantage women because of their sex, including their 
reproductive capabilities. "226 The court reasoned that "[s]ince only 
women become pregnant," any funding scheme that effectively 
forecloses their access to abortion "when it is medically necessary 
223 Id. at 159. Connecticut's ERA was adopted as an amendment to its equal 
protection clause in 1974. Id. at 158. Prior to that amendment, the state equal 
protection clause read as follows: 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be 
subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or 
enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race, 
color, ancestry or national origin. 
Id. at 158 n.50. Section 20 was amended on Nov. 27, 1974 and again on Nov. 28, 
1984. Section 20 now reads as follows: 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be 
subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or 
enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, 
race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental 
disability. 
Id. at 158 n.51. 
224 Id. at 159 (citations omitted) (quoting Evening Sentinel v. NOW, 357 A.2d 498, 
503 (Conn. 1975)). 
225 Id. at 160. 
226 Doe, 515 A.2d at 160; see id. at 158 (discussing the 1974 adoption of 
Connecticut's ERA and displaying the language of the state's equal protection clause as 
it appeared prior to and after the amendment). 
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and when all other medical expenses are paid by the state for both 
men and women is sex-oriented discrimination, "227 and therefore 
violates the state ERA. 228 
This decision shows that state ERAs can be enormously 
helpful in challenging abortion regulations.229 In the same way that 
express privacy provisions are often deemed more potent than implicit 
guarantees,230 an ERA can be employed as a more potent equal 
protection clause. Indeed, some states have interpreted their ERAs 
as requiring absolute scrutiny, a standard even more exacting than 
traditional strict scrutiny. 231 In applying absolute scrutiny, the court 
will not consider any justification for gender-discrimination once it is 
found. The Washington Supreme Court, for example, has held that: 
The ERA, on the other hand, is a very different 
animal from the equal protection clause-indeed, it 
has no counterpart in the federal constitution. The 
ERA absolutely prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex and is not subject to even the narrow 
exceptions permitted under traditional "strict 
scrutiny. " . . . The ERA mandates equality in the 
strongest of terms and absolutely prohibits the 
sacrifice of equality for any state interest, no matter 
how compelling, though separate equality may be 
permissible in some very limited circumstances. 232 
In addition to Connecticut and Washington, thirteen other states have 
m Id. at 159. 
m Id. at 160. 
229 But see Fischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985) 
(rejecting state equal protection and state equal rights theories in a challenge to abortion 
funding restrictions). 
230 See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 214 Cal. App.3d 
831, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the express privacy guarantee contained 
in the California Constitution is broader than the federal right to privacy and striking 
down a statute requiring parental consent for minors to receive an abortion because it 
violated the California Constitution's express privacy guarantee). 
231 National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (Wash. 
1983). 
232 Id. at 1102 (emphasis in original). 
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adopted ERAs. 233 Some, like Connecticut, simply amended their 
equal protection clauses to include express references to sex or 
gender.234 Others, like Washington, adopted provisions based on the 
ill-fated federal model. 235 Two states, Utah236 and Wyoming,237 have 
equal protection clauses containing express references to sex, but the , 
language, lying dormant since the 19th century, has never been given 
force or effect. Largely untapped, state ERAs can be a powerful 
source of protection against governmental restrictions on women's 
reproductive autonomy. 
c. Casey-type Restrictions Are Vulnerable to Challenge Even 
Under a State Equal Protection Clause Deemed Coextensive with 
the Federal Guarantee 
Not every state court judge will be willing to perform an 
expansive interpretation of the state equal protection clause. It may 
nevertheless be possible to invalidate Casey-type restrictions under a 
state equal protection clause deemed coextensive with the federal 
guarantee. Confronted with a judge who is determined to impose a 
lock-step construction on the state and federal equal protection 
233 AU.SKA CONST. art. I,§ 3 (amended 1972); COLORADO CONST. art. II,§ 29 (amended 
1972); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 (amended 1974); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3 (amended 
1972); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (amended 1974); MA. CONST. 
DECLARA TIONOF RIGHTS, Art. 46(amended1972); MASS. CONST. part I, art. 1 (amended 
1976); MONT. CONST. art. II,§ 4 (amended 1972); N.H. CONST. part I, art. 2 (amended 
1974); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18 (amended 1973); PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 (amended 
1971); TEX. CONST. art. I,§ 3a (amended 1972); VA. CONST. art. I,§ 11(amended1971); 
WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1 (amended 1972). 
234 CONN. CONST. art. I, §20(amended 1974); LA. CONST.art. I, §3 (amended1974); 
MASS. CONST. part I, art. 1(amended1976); MONT. CONST. art. II,§ 4(amended1972); 
N.H. CONST. part I, art. 2 (amended 1974); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a (amended 1972); 
VA. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
235 ALASKA CONST. art. I,§ 3(amended1972); COLO. CONST. art. II,§ 29 (amended 
1972); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 21 (amended 1972); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18 (amended 
1970); Mo. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 46 (amended 1972); N .M. CONST. art. II, 
§ 18 (amended 1973); PA. CONST. art. I,§ 28(amended1971); WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 
1 (amended 1972). 
236 UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1896). 
237 WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; art. VI, § 1 (1890). 
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clauses, it will be necessary to proceed with the sort of analysis long 
employed under the federal charter. Federal equal protection analysis 
is triggered in two different contexts-class-based discrimination238 
and deprivations of fundamental rights.239 This article will address 
both prongs in turn. 
i. Gender-based Discrimination 
Writing separately in Casey, Justice Blackmun observed that 
abortion restrictions raise issues outside the realm of liberty and 
privacy; they implicate equal protection concerns as well: 
A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate 
her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees 
of gender equality. State restrictions on abortion 
compel women to continue pregnancies they otherwise 
might terminate. By restricting the right to terminate 
pregnancies, the State conscripts women's bodies into 
its service, forcing women to continue their 
pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in 
most instances, provide years of maternal care. The 
State does not compensate women for their services; 
instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a matter 
of course. This assumption-that women can simply 
be forced to accept the "natural" status and incidents 
of motherhood- appears to rest upon a conception of 
women's role that has triggered the protection of the 
Equal Protection Clause. The joint opinion [in Casey] 
recognizes that these assumptions about women's 
place in society "are no longer consistent with our 
understanding of the family, the individual, or the 
238 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) 
(gender-based classification struck down). 
239 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540-43 (1942) (applying strict 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to strike down compulsory sterilization law). 
58 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI 
Constitution. "240 
In response to an equal protection claim, the court must first 
determine whether the regulation is in fact a gender-based 
classification. 241 In fending off such a claim, the government will 
likely argue that· Casey-type restrictions operate alike on all persons 
similarly situated-women seeking an abortion. Because abortion is 
a medical procedure applicable only to pregnant women, abortion 
regulations make no gender-based classification. According to this 
argument, such restrictions cannot violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
This argument will prove formidable, but it contains flaws 
that may be exploited. The best response is that the government, in 
identifying the range of "similarly situated" people, draws an unduly 
narrow map. Men and women both engage in sexual activity. Men 
and women both make reproductive decisions. Men and women are 
both affected by the consequences of an unplanned pregnancy. Men 
and women both have an interest in retaining their reproductive 
autonomy. Restrictions on the availability of abortion cripple the 
reproductive autonomy of women, impairing their capacity to 
participate fully in society and furthering their perennial subjugation. 
As Laurence Tribe observes: "To ignore woman's unique role in 
human reproduction is to allow women to lay claim to equality only 
insofar as they are like men. "242 
A statute restricting access to abortion constitutes a gender-
based classification per se because it classifies on the basis of a trait 
which, as a matter of biology, only women possess. The direct 
impact of a measure restricting abortion falls on a class of people that 
consists exclusively of women. 243 A gender-based impact occurs in 
240 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2846-47 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
241 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-725 (1982). 
242 1.AURENCE H. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITlITIONAL LAW§ 16-29, at 1303 (2d ed. 1988). 
243 Cf Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) 
(treating a statutory rape law as a gender-based classification despite no express 
reference to 'men' or 'males' where only men can "accomplish sexual intercourse ... 
with a female"); accord Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 652 (1974) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that a schoql board regulation requiring pregnant 
school teachers to take unpaid maternity leave could be invalidated more soundly on 
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a pregnancy-related case when the government's policy burdens 
women rather than simply fails to benefit them. Thus, in Nashville 
Gas Company v. Satty, 244 the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that 
plaintiffs established a disparate impact, because the employment 
policy substantially burdened women's reproductive freedom. 245 
Once a gender-based classification is identified, it will be 
deemed unconstitutional unless its proponents 11 carry the burden of 
showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification.' 11246 In assessing the 
justifications offered for gender-based measures, the Court undertakes 
a 11 searching analysis "247 of whether the restriction is, in fact, 
"substantially related to the statutory objective. 11248 This "searching 
analysis 11 is required because gender-based measures are often not the 
product of reasoned analysis; rather, measures that single out one 
gender for special disadvantages often reflect the mechanical 
application of archaic sexual stereotypes. 249 
equal protection grounds); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (analogizing 
LaFleur to the cases establishing that gender-based classifications receive heightened 
scrutiny). 
244 434 u .s. 136 (1977). 
245 A gender-based impact is established when the government "has not merely 
refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but has 
imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer." Salty, 434 U.S. at 
142. Contra Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 485 (1974) (holding that distinctions 
based on pregnancy which determined the grant of disability payments were not gender-
based). Although Salty involved an alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act, the Court used the same analysis to determine whether a gender-based impact had 
been established as it would have in a constitutional case. See Salty, 434 U.S. at 138-
44. Additionally, Salty was decided before Congress amended Title VII expressly to 
make clear that regulations involving pregnancy were to be considered gender-based. 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991)). Therefore the Salty Court decided, without the benefit 
of statutory interpretation, that the regulation constituted gender-based discrimination by 
analogizing Title VII analysis to equal protection analysis. See 434 U.S. at 142. The 
Supreme Court subsequently has conceded that, for statutory purposes, "discrimination 
based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex." 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983). 
246 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (quoting Kirchberg 
v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)). 
247 Id. at 728. 
248 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976). 
249 Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724-26 nn. 10-11. 
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Especially in the context of gender-based restrictions, courts 
must be wary that government officials not ascribe worthy objectives 
to legislation that actually reflects archaic and stereotypical 
conceptions of women. 250 This danger is particularly acute in the 
case of abortion restrictions. Such measures, shrewdly characterized 
as advancing the cause of "informed consent," may actually reflect 
a desire to confine women to a single role-that of child-bearers. 251 
Such a motivation renders the legislation unconstitutional. 252 Casey-
type provisions, by placing substantial burdens in the paths of women 
seeking abortion, are clearly motivated by such stereotypical and 
paternalistic conceptions. 
ii. Deprivati.on of a Fundamental Right 
The heightened scrutiny applicable to gender-based 
classifications escalates to the highest level where, as here, legislation 
that discriminates on the basis of gender also intrudes on bodily 
2SO Id. at 725. 
251 This historical preoccupation with women as child-bearers is particularly evident 
in Ohio. Indeed, the legislative history of an 1867 statute criminalizing abortion strongly 
supports this assertion: 
The report characterized abortion as a source of grave physical and 
moral danger to women, because abortion was a violation of nature's 
laws and '[a)ny interference with nature's laws results in evils 
innumerable.' It deplored the ignorance which led 'our otherwise 
amiable sisters to the commission of this crime,' and held women 
who resisted motherhood in the utmost contempt, condemning those 
who yielded to '[t]he demands of society and fashionable life' and 
succumbed to 'the desire of freedom from care and home duties and 
responsibilities.' The report concluded with a strong warning to the 
married women of Ohio ... charg[ing] that wives who 'avoid[ed] 
the duties and responsibilities of married life' were 'living in a state 
of legalized prostitution,' thereby endangering the manifest destiny 
of the race. 
Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation 
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 316-17 (1992) (quoting 1867 
Ohio Senate J. App. 233, 233-35). 
252 See Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 726 n.11. (stressing the need to 
invalidate legislation whose gender-based classification "was based upon traditional 
assumptions that 'the female [is] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the 
family"') (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)). 
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integrity, procreation, health, and family. 253 Though the U.S. 
Supreme Court may no longer regard abortion as a fundamental 
right, 254 it is nevertheless possible to obtain strict scrutiny by 
persuading a state court to hold, as a matter of state constitutional 
law, that freedom of choice is a fundamental guarantee. In the 
abortion funding cases discussed above,255 the courts in New York,256 
New Jersey, 257 California, 258 and Connecticut259 each held that the 
freedom to choose abortion is a fundamental right under the state 
constitution. Since those holdings rest on independent state grounds, 
they are insulated from the U.S. Supreme Court's apparent retreat. 
Principles of federalism also ensure that state courts confronted with 
this issue in the future will not be constrained to follow the High 
Court's lead. 260 
3. Free Speech 
"Informed consent" provisions of the sort upheld in Casey 
violate free speech guarantees because, through the mandatory 
delivery of state-printed materials, the government is disseminating 
propaganda-namely, an anti-abortion message-to a captive 
audience, and is forcing taxpayers and abortion clinics to fund that 
2S3 See, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause to a compulsory sterilization Jaw); Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause to a marriage restriction that discriminated against persons with outstanding child-
support obligations). Accord Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2846 (Blackmun, J. concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("In short, restrictive 
abortion Jaws force women to endure physical invasions far more substantial than those 
this Court has held to violate the constitutional principle of bodily integrity in other 
contexts."). 
2S4 See supra note 211; Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821. 
255 See supra notes 197-207 and accompanying text. 
256 Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991), ajf'd, 595 
N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1993), dismissed, 601 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. 1993). 
251 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (N.J. 1982). 
258 Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 790 (Cal. 1981). 
259 Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 159 (Conn. 1986). 
260 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
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message. By compelling medical providers to communicate the 
state's ideology, by requiring women seeking abortions to receive 
materials setting forth the state's view on abortion, or by requiring 
the physician to communicate With his or her patient in order to 
explain or ameliorate the effects of state-mandated information, such 
provisions offend basic principles of free speech.261 
Though the U.S. Supreme Court did not expressly rely on the 
First Amendment when it struck down similar regulations in the 
1980s,262 it employed an analysis that implicated free speech values.263 
Those rulings-later repudiated in Casey264-may be replicated by 
means of state free speech guarantees. 
a. Exploiting Textual Differences Between State Free Speech 
Guarantees and the Federal First Amendment 
In pursuing such a theory, it will be advantageous to show 
that the state free speech clause is broader than the Federal First 
Amendment. To this end, it would be wise to exploit textual 
differences between the state and federal provisions. In many states, 
the free speech guarantee is phrased very differently than the First 
Amendment. The federal speech clause, like every other provision 
in the Bill of Rights, is phrased negatively-as a restraint on 
governmental power: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom Of Speech, Or Of the press .... "265 
State free speech provisions may be grouped into three 
categories: those that emulate the exclusively negative language of 
261 See generally Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of 
Government Expression and the First Amendment, 51 TEX. L. REV. 863, 869 (1979) 
(holding a public right to know does not justify a constitutional right for governments 
to engage in extensive communications activities). 
262 City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983) 
(liberty/privacy theory); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1986) (liberty/privacy theory). 
263 See infra notes 295-309 and accompanying text. 
264 Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
265 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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ihe Federal First Amendment,266 those that confer speech rights in 
sweeping affirmative language, 267 and those that combine affirmative 
and negative clauses.268 
These affirmative expressions, whether or not coupled with 
a negative clause, provide a striking contrast to the federal charter. 
Pennsylvania's provmon is a good example: "The free 
communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable 
rights of man,· and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print 
on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that right. "269 The 
broad scope of this clause, and the fact that it contains virtually no 
limiting language, suggest that it may be more protective of speech 
than the Federal First Amendment. 
b. Textual Analysis Under the Ohio· Constitution 
Ohio's speech guarantee contains both affirmative and 
negative language: "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and 
266 12 states, along with the District of Columbia, feature negative language of the 
sort employed in the First Amendment: D. C. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 4; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IND. CONST. art. I, § 9; KY. CONST. art. I, § 4; Mo. 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 10; MASS. CONST. part I, art. 16; N .C. CONST. art. I, 
§ 14; OR. CONST. art. I, § 8; R.l. CONST. art. I, § 21; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; UTAH 
CONST. art. I,§ 15; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7. 
w There are 18 states with speech clauses phrased solely in affirmative language: 
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5; ARiz. CONST. art. I, § 6; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 6; CONN. 
CONST. art. I, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. 
I, § 4; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 11; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 
13; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.H. CONST. part I, art. 22; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4; PA. 
CONST. art. I, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19; WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 5; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
·
268 20 states feature speech provisions that combine affirmative and negative clauses: 
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; GA. 
CONST. art. I, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; LA. CONST. art. I, § 7; ME. CONST. art. 
I, § 4; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7; 
NEV. CONST. art. I,§ 9; N.J. CONST. art. I, part 6; N.M. CONST. art. II,§ 17; N.Y. 
CONST. art. I, § 8; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; TEx. CONST. 
art. I, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 13; VA. CONST. art. I, § 12; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 
3. 
269 PA. CONST. art. I, § 7. Virtually identical language may be found in ARK. 
CONST. art. II, § 6 and TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19. 
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publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse 
of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the 
liberty of speech, or of the press. "27° Free speech provisions of this 
sort may represent the best opportunity for securing broader 
protection than that afforded by the Federal First Amendment. By 
combining negative, federal-style restraints with an affirmative grant 
of rights, such provisions may be seen as going beyond the First 
Amendment's scope. 
A close textual analysis of Ohio's provision supports this 
argument. Ohio's free speech guarantee contains two distinct clauses 
separated by a semicolon; only the second clause-"no law shall be 
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the 
press" -corresponds to the federal provision. Had the Ohio drafters 
intended to offer no greater protection for speech and press than that 
provided by the First Amendment, they would have employed only 
the second cla,use. 
But Article I, § 11 contains other language as well. It says 
at its very beginning (and therefore, presumably, of most importance 
to its drafters): "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish 
his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the 
right. "271 The second clause cannot be deemed redundant of the first 
clause-such a construction would conflict with long-standing 
principles of interpretation governing the Ohio Constitution: "In the 
construction of a section of the [Ohio] constitution, the whole section 
should be construed together, and effect given to every pan and 
sentence. "272 
Thus, the scope of Ohio's free speech provision cannot be 
confined to the language in its second clause-and since that second 
clause is identical to the federal free speech guarantee, Ohio's 
provision is necessarily broader than its federal counterpart. Indeed, 
state courts interpreting free speech provisions similar to Ohio's have 
concluded that their constitutions confer more sweeping protection 
270 Omo CONST. art. I, § 11. 
211 Id. 
m Froelich v. Cleveland, 124 N .E. 212, 216 (Ohio 1919) (emphasis added). 
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than the First Amendment. 273 
c. Decisions Construing State Free Speech Provisions More 
Broadly Than the Federal First Amendment 
65 
Whether state speech clauses exceed the First Amendment's 
scope is a question addressed in a line of cases involving speech 
activities in privately-owned shopping malls.. In a 1972 shopping 
mall case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment 
serves only to restrain governmental restrictions on speech.274 This 
issue has since been litigated under state constitutions, with results 
that are instructive for our purposes. 
The question addressed in these cases is whether the state 
constitution is broad enough to govern private actors who suppress 
speech. Such an issue necessarily requires the court to decide 
whether the state speech clause is broader than the First Amendment. 
A number of .these decisions have construed speech guarantees that, 
like Ohio's,275 feature both negative and affirmative language. The 
results, not surprisingly, are mixed. California,276 New Jersey ,277 
and, most recently, Colorado278 have deemed their speech clauses 
sufficiently broad to confer a limited right of access to private 
273 See Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 56 (Colo. 1991) (holding that, 
unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Colorado Constitution protects an individual's right to 
distribute political pamphlets within the public spaces of a privately-owned mall); Robins 
v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 342 (Cal. 1979) (holding that soliciting 
signatures at a shopping center is an activity protected by the California Constitution); 
State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626 (N.J. 1980) (holding that the New Jersey 
Constitution afforded greater protection to rights of expression than the U.S. 
Constitution). 
274 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972). 
275 The Ohio Supreme Court recently rejected the notion that the state constitution's 
free speech guarantee affords any right of access to the common areas of privately-
owned malls for speech activites. Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N .E.2d 59 (Ohio 
1994). 
276 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979). 
m State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 632-33 (N.J. 1980) (campus of private 
university), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980). 
778 Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 61 (Colo. 1991) (shopping mall). 
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property for speech activity. 279 Seven other states have 
demurred,280-though, in the process, one acknowledged that the state 
279 Cf. Right to Life Advocates v. Aaron Women's Clinic, 737 S.W.2d 564, 567-68 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) (although the court did not 
allow expressive activity in this case, the court adopted the New Jersey test established 
in Schmid, 423 A.2d at 632-22, and stated that an abortion clinic is different than a 
shopping mall and implied that it would allow free speech in a shopping mall). 
280 The Michigan Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to free 
speech in a privately owned shopping mall. Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 
N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985). The Woodland court cited debates of the Michigan 
Constitutional Convention in which the delegates debated and rejected a provision that 
would have broadened the free speech clause. Id. at 345-46. Thus the delegates 
expressly intended that Michigan's free speech guarantee would extend only to state 
action. Id. New York's highest court has held that its constitution affords no protection 
for someone who wants to distribute leaflets in a private shopping mall. SHAD Alliance 
v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1218 (N.Y. 1985). Of special significance to 
the court was the fact that New York's constitution was adopted at a relatively early.date 
(1822); this distinguished it from the New Jersey provision construed in Schmid, which 
was drafted in 1844. Id. at 1214-15. Historical records showed, moreover, that the 
New York provision was based on the Federal Bill of Rights. Id. at 1213. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the positive-negative language in the state free 
speech clause is not ambiguous, and that it serves to restrain only the government. 
Jacobs v. Major, 407 N .W.2d 832, 836-37 (Wis. 1987). The court traced the Wisconsin 
provision to those of New York and Connecticut, which have been interpreted by their 
courts as affording no speech rights in shopping malls. Id. at 842. The court found it 
significant, moreover, that Wisconsin does not have an initiative provision. Id. at 843-
44. Finally, the court observed that the speech activity at issue occurred in Madison 
(site of the state capitol and the University of Wisconsin) thus, the court reasoned, there 
were plenty of traditional public forums available to the petitioner. Id. at 844. While 
conceding that a state constitution may afford more expansive protections than the U.S. 
Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the history of its constitution 
required the conclusion that its bill of rights applies only to state action. Western Pa. 
Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 
1334-35 (Pa. 1986). The state supreme courts in Georgia and Iowa found no protection 
in their constitutions for speech in privately owned shopping malls. Neither court, 
however, perfonned an extensive analysis of its constitutional text or heritage. The 
Georgia court merely echoed the reasoning in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 
(1972) (construing the Federal Constitution). Citizens for Ethical Govt., Inc. v. Gwinnett 
Place Ass'n, 392 S.E.2d 8, 9-10 (Ga. 1990). The Iowa court offered a very limited 
analysis, holding simply that the state constitution does not allow free speech on private 
property. State v. Lacey, 465 N.W.2d 537, 539-40 (Iowa 1991). Such claims were 
most recently rejected in Ohio, where the state supreme court, ignoring the textual 
differences between the state free speech clause and the Federal First Amendment, 
treated the case essentially as a dispute over property rights, devoid of any larger free 
speech implications. Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 60-62 (Ohio 
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speech guarantee might be broader than the First Amendment. 281 
Mixed results have likewise occurred in cases where the state speech 
clause is phrased solely in affirmative language. 282 
The California, New Jersey, and Colorado decisions provide 
an encouraging sign that state supreme courts may be willing to view 
state speech guarantees as substantially broader than the First 
Amendment. The analysis performed in these cases provides useful 
instruction to those who would invoke a state speech clause in 
challenging Casey-type "informed consent" provisions. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court performed both a textual and 
a historical analysis. It began with a close comparison between its 
speech clause and the Federal First Amendment. "A basis for finding 
exceptional vitality in the New Jersey Constitution with respect to 
individual rights of speech and assembly is found in part in the 
1994). 
281 Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut General 
Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1333-34 (Pa. 1986). 
282 Of the states with free speech clauses phrased only in affirmative language, four 
have ruled on this issue. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that there 
is a right to collect signatures in a shopping mall for election petitions. Batchelder v. 
Allied Stores Int'), Inc., 448 N .E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983). Though the court relied on the 
Massachusetts free election provision, it stressed that the provision is written as a 
positive right. Id. at 593. Therefore, it is not directed solely at state action. Id. The 
court also noted that malls function "in many parts of th[e] Stat~ much as the 
'downtown' area of a municipality did in earlier years." Id. at 595. This quasi-public 
aspect of malls prompted the court to recognize them as latter-day public forums. Id. 
The Washington Supreme Court has held that the fundamental nature of its constitution 
is to protect individuais from the abuse of state power. Southcenter Joint Venture v. 
National Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282 (Wash. 1989). Thus, it held that 
there is no right to free speech in a private mall. Id. at 1292. The Connecticut Supreme 
Court likewise held that its constitution provides. no right to free speech in a shopping 
mall. Cologne v. Westfanns Assoc., 469 A.2d 120 (Conn. 1984). The Court relied, 
however, on the fact that its constitution was adopted in 1818 (near the time of New 
York's), and that according to contemporaneous historical accounts, it was the popular 
sentiment then that bills of rights should protect against infringement of liberties by the 
government; and, finally, that there is nothing in Connecticut's history to suggest that 
this provision was intended to reach private suppression of speech. Id. at 1207-08 
(emphasis added). An Arizona appeals court held that while the state constitution may 
provide more protection than its federal counterpart, it does not provide the right to free 
speech in a private mall. Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Committee, 767 P.2d 
719, 723 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (analyzing the history of its free speech provision, and 
finding nothing to indicate that it was intended to restrain private conduct). 
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language employed. Our Constitution ajfirnuitively recognizes these 
freedoms .... "283 The court construed this affirmative language as 
conferring a direct grant of speech rights to the people. 284 
Accordingly, New Jersey's speech clause is "more sweeping in scope 
than the language of the First Amendment, "28s because the affirmative 
clause performs a different function than the negative, federal-style 
clause with which it is combined: "[O]ur State Constitution not only 
affirmatively guarantees to individuals the rights of speech and 
assembly, but also expressly prohibits government itself, in a manner 
analogous to the federal First and Fourteenth Amendments, from 
unlawfully restraining or abridging 'the liberty of speech. "'286 Thus, 
by combining an affirmative grant of speech rights with negative 
restraints on governmental power, New Jersey's speech clause is 
broader than the First Amendment-broad enough to reach private 
suppression of speech.287 
The New Jersey court followed its textual analysis with a 
brief examination of local history and tradition: "Since it is our State 
Constitution which we are here expounding, it is also fitting that we 
look to our own strong traditions which prize the exercise of 
individual rights and stress the societal obligations that are 
concomitant to a public enjoyment of private property. "288 Based on 
its textual and historical analysis, the court recognized a limited right 
of access to private property for speech activities, and announced a 
three-part balancing test for determining when such access must be 
283 State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626 (N.J. 1980) (emphasis added). 
284 Id. at 627 ("Hence, the explicit affirmation of these fundamental rights in our 
Constitution can be seen as a guarantee of those rights and not as a restriction upon 
them.") (emphasis added). 
Id. 
285 Id. at 626. 
286 Id. at 628 (emphasis added). 
287 Schmid, 423 A.2d at 628. 
[T]he rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the State 
Constitution are protectable not only against governmental or public 
bodies, but under some circumstances against private persons as 
well. . . . The State Constitution in this fashion serves to thwart 
inhibitory actions which unreasonably frustrate, infringe, or obstruct 
the expressional and associational rights of individuals exercised 
under [our speech and assembly provisions] .... 
288 Id. at 629-30. 
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granted. 289 
The Supreme Courts of California290 and Colorado291 likewise 
performed a textual analysis, each holding that affirmative language 
in the state constitution's speech guarantee creates a broader sweep 
than the First Amendment. 292 The Colorado Supreme Court also 
looked to history, noting that its free speech guarantee had long been 
construed more broadly than the First Amendment, 293 and that the 
Colorado courts had developed a "tolerance standard" in deciding 
speech cases that imposed "more stringent scrutiny" than federal 
jurisprudence. 294 
These cases demonstrate the vitality of free speech protection 
289 The court set forth its new standard as follows: 
Accordingly, we now hold that under the State Constitution, the test 
to be applied to ascertain the parameters of the rights of speech and 
assembly upon privately-owned property and the extent to which 
such property reasonably can be restricted to accommodate these 
rights involves several elements. This standard must take into 
account (1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private 
property, generally, its "normal" use, (2) the extent and nature of the 
public's invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the 
expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to 
both the private and public use of the property. This is a multi-
faceted test which must be applied to ascertain whether in a given 
case owners of private property may be required to permit, subject 
to suitable restrictions, the reasonable exercise by individuals of the 
constitutional freedoms of speech and assembly. 
Id. at 630. 
290 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346, (Cal. 1979) (holding that 
California's speech clause is "'more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment' . 
. . . ") (quoting Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116, 120 (Cal. 1975)). 
291 Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991) (identifying the 
"affirmative declaration" contained in the second clause of Colorado's speech guarantee 
as "necessarily enhanc[ing] the already preferred position of speech under the [Federal] 
First Amendment ... "); The court held that "the second clause of [Colorado's speech 
provision] is an affirmative acknowledgement of the liberty of speech, and therefore of 
greater scope than that guaranteed by the First Amendment .... " Id. at 59 (emphasis 
added). 
292 See Pruneyard, 592 P.2d at 347 n.5 (granting a limited right of access to 
shoppi11g malls, expanding the public forum doctrine under their state constitution and 
recognizing that the common areas of modem malls are latter-day public forums); see 
also Bock, 819 P.2d at 62. 
293 Bock, 819 P.2d at 59-60. 
294 Id. at 60. 
70 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI 
under state constitutions. The expansive interpretation of state speech 
guarantees that developed in this line of cases may be readily applied 
in other contexts, including the government-compelled speech 
imposed under Casey-type "informed consent" provisions. 
d. State Constitutional Guarantees of Free Speech Can Replicate 
Now Repudiated U.S. Supreme Court Decisions That Struck 
Down Government Efforts to Use "lnfonned Consent" 
Regulations to Compel Anti-abortion Speech 
Governmental efforts to compel anti-abortion speech under the 
guise of "informed consent" regulations may be challenged under 
state free speech provisions. In pursuing such a challenge, the 
rudiments of a theory may be gleaned from two cases, City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health295 and Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,296 in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down "informed consent" provisions that 
required doctors to convey various anti-abortion messages to their 
patients. 297 Though the Court did not expressly rely on the First 
Amendment in arriving at these rulings,298 it employed an analysis 
that implicated free speech values.299 These decisions-later 
repudiated in Casey3°0-may be replicated by means of state free 
speech guarantees. 
In both Akron and Thornburgh, the Court raised special 
concerns about the government forcing doctors to communicate an 
295 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
296 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
m Akron, 462 U.S. at 445; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764. 
298 In both cases, the Court was presented with the usual liberty/privacy theory. 
Akron, 462 U.S. at 443-45; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 758-59. 
299 Akron, 462 U.S. at 445; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762-63. Prior to Akron and 
Thornburgh, lower federal courts had employed a similar free speech analysis in striking 
down "right to know" provisions governing abortion. See Planned Parenthood League 
v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1021-22 (1st Cir. 1981); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 
784 (7th Cir. 1980); Women's Medical Ctr. v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136, 1153-54 
(D.R.I. 1982). 
300 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (overruling Akron aild Thornburgh). The Court expressly 
rejected a First Amendment theory advanced by petitioners. Id. at 2824. 
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anti-abortion message. The Akron Court observed that "much of the 
information is designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather 
to persuade her to withhold it altogether. "301 By "intru[ding] upon 
the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician, "302 the government 
was "placing the physician in . . . an 'undesired and uncomfortable 
straitjacket.' "303 
This concern with government-compelled speech was voiced 
even more emphatically in Thornburgh. Referring to a requirement 
that doctors give their patients state-printed brochures containing 
pictures of fetal development, the Court wrote: "The printed 
materials . . . seem to us to be nothing less than an outright attempt 
to wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion into 
the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and 
her physician. "304 The Court recognized that the government was 
effectively forcing doctors to communicate-and, inevitably, to 
validate-its anti-abortion message: "Forcing the physician . . . to 
present the materials . . . to the woman makes him or her in effect 
an agent of the State in treating the woman and places his or her 
· · th · l 1130s 1mpnmatur upon. . . e matena s .... 
This analysis provides the kernel of a free speech theory that, 
though unavailable under the First Amendment, 306 might well be 
advanced under state constitutions. The essence of this theory is 
government-compelled speech: forcing individuals to convey the 
government's anti-abortion ideology, whether or not they agree with 
it. 307 As we have seen,308 affirmative language in state free speech 
guarantees may be construed as a positive grant of speech rights. 
301 462 U.S. at 444. 
302 Id. at 445. 
303 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)). 
304 476 U.S. at 762. 
305 Id. at 763. 
306 Casey expressly rejected a First Amendment.claim directed at "informed consent" 
requirements virtually identical to those struck down in Thornburgh. 112 S. Ct. at 2824. 
3'11 Cf Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that the State of New 
Hampshire could not require plaintiffs, who were followers of the Jehovah's Witnesses 
faith, to display the state motto-"Live Free or Die"-on their license plates). The 
government cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, "require an individual to 
participate in the dissemination of an ideological message." Id. at 713. 
3111 See supra notes 274-87 and accompanying text. 
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State provisions that feature such affirmative phrasing do not merely 
restrain governmental suppression of speech; they also "impose upon 
the . . . government an affirmative obligation to protect fundamental 
individual rights. "309 Thus, the freedom of speech conveyed by such 
a provision guarantees not only protection.from the government, but 
protection by the government. This freedom of speech necessarily 
entails the freedom not to be made the unwilling mouthpiece of the 
state. 
E. Employing State Constitutional Provisions with No Federal 
Counterpart-the "Freedom of Conscience" Guarantee 
Many state constitutions contain "freedom of conscience" 
guarantees. 310 Such provisions may represent an invaluable tool in 
challenging Casey-type regulations. By compelling medical providers 
to convey to their patients a state-mandated message disapproving of 
abortion; by establishing a state orthodoxy regarding abortion, and, 
through the imposition of procedural obstacles, punishing women who 
seek abortion; or, by invading the doctor-patient dialogue with a 
governmental message disapproving of abortion, Casey-type 
restrictions arguably violate the right to freedom of conscience. 311 
309 State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 627 (N.J. 1980) (emphasis added). 
310 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 24; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; 
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § l; GA. CONST. art. I, § 3; IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; KAN. CONST. 
BILL OF RIOHTS, § 7; KY. CONST. BILL OF RIOHTS, §§ l, 5; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; 
MASS. CONST. part I, art. II; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; 
Mo. CONST. art. I, § 5; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.H. 
CONST. part I, art. 4, 5; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11; N.Y. 
CONST. art. I, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. 
art. I, § 7; OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; PA. CONST. art. I, § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3; 
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6; UTAH 
CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 4; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 3; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 11; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; and WYO. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
311 See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2822-25 (upholding "informed consent" provision and 24-
hour waiting period to review anti-abortion literature). 
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1. Textual Analysis 
Ohio's "freedom of conscience" guarantee has no identical 
counterpart in the U.S. Constitution, and is directly applicable to the 
issue of reproductive freedom. The provision is set forth in the midst 
of other guarantees protecting religious and moral independence. 
Article I, § 7 provides in pertinent part: 
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of 
their own conscience. No person shall be compelled 
to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or 
maintain any form of worship, against his consent; 
and no preference shall be given, by law, to any 
religious society; nor shall any interference with the 
rights of conscience be permitted . ... 312 
The Federal Constitution has no identical counterpart; its only 
analogous provisions are the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . 
•• "
313 These federal provisions are expressly tied to "religion." The 
Ohio Constitution, however, extends beyond the traditional sphere of 
religion to embrace the more sweeping concept of "conscience." 
Freedom of conscience necessarily includes moral and philosophical 
views that lay far beyond the confines of established religion. 314 
A textual comparison reveals, therefore, that Ohio's freedom 
of conscience provision exceeds the scope of the federal religion 
clauses. This reading is consistent with Ohio's long-standing 
tradition of constitutional interpretation, which requires that effect be 
given to every part and sentence of a constitutional provision.315 
312 Omo CONST. art. I, § 7 (1851) (emphasis added). 
313 U.S. CONST. amend. I (1791). 
314 
"Conscience is that moral sense in man which dictates to him right and wrong." 
Harden v. State, 216 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1948). In Casey, Justice Stevens specifically 
described a woman's decision whether or not to have an abortion as a matter of 
"conscience." 112 S. Ct. at 2842 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
31.! Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376 (1919) (emphasis added). 
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Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court, construing a right of 
conscience provision virtually identical to Ohio's, 316 has ruled that the 
Minnesota provision "is broader and more emphatic than the religion 
clauses of the [Federal Constitution]. "317 More recently, a Minnesota 
appeals court held that· this conscience clause is broad enough to 
protect individual views on abonion. 318 
2. Whether Construed Broadly or Narrowly, Ohio's Freedom of 
Conscience Provision Reaches-and Invalidates-Provisions of 
the Sort Uphekl in Casey 
a. Broad Construction 
Construed broadly, Ohio's freedom of conscience provision 
easily reaches, and invalidates, Casey. If it means anything, the right 
of conscience must prevent the government from interfering in 
decisions that involve deeply held moral and philosophical views. Its 
application is all the more critical when the decision will have a 
profound impact on the direction of a person's life. For women, the 
prospect of an abortion poses precisely such a decision. By invading 
the doctor-patient dialogue with a governmental message disapproving 
of abortion, such regulations violate the right to freedom of 
conscience guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution. 
316 See Minn. Const. art. I, § 16 ("The right of every man to worship God according 
to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; ... nor shall any control 
of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted."). 
317 State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990) (holding that a state 
statute requiring Amish citizens to display a slow-moving-vehicle emblem on their horse-
drawn carriages violated the state's freedom-of-conscience guarantee). Accord State e;r; 
rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990) (right of conscience precludes 
imposing civil penalties upon landlord who refused, on moral grounds, to rent apartment 
to unmarried couple). 
318 Rasmussen v. Glass, 498 N.W.2d 508, 516 (Minn. App. 1993) (holding that the 
owner of a delicatessen could not be prosecuted under a public accommodations 
ordinance for refusing,. on grounds of moral conscience, to deliver food to an abortion 
clinic). Since this refusal to set foot inside the clinic was based upon his profound 
opposition to the services performed there, the owner's actions, were a direct expression 
of his right of conscience, and therefore could not be punished consistent with the state 
constitution. Id. 
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b. Narrow Construction 
Even if construed narrowly-confined, for example, to 
governmental interference with religious beliefs319-0hio's conscience 
provision invalidates a statute like that addressed in Casey. The issue 
of abortion is necessarily intertwined with religious and moral 
perspectives.320 Indeed, it is undeniable that "the intensely divisive 
character of much of the national debate over the abortion issue 
reflects the deeply held religious convictions of many participants in 
the debate. " 32 ~ Those who oppose freedom of choice consistently 
base their position on the religious principle that life begins at 
conception.322 But other religions, notably Judaism, teach that life 
does not begin until live birth, and give precedence "to the well-being 
of the woman and her existing family. "323 Thus, a woman's freedom 
of conscience is ultimately the freedom to act in accordance with her 
own religious and moral beliefs. And a state-mandated message 
disapproving of abortion, coupled with governmental efforts to 
burden or penalize women who seek abortion, is nothing less than an 
effort by the government to force women to adhere to a particular 
religious viewpoint-in direct violation of Ohio's freedom of 
319 Confining Ohio's conscience provision solely to "religious" beliefs will not 
necessarily narrow its application in any significant way. See Robert L. Rabin, When 
is a Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 
51 CORNELL L.Q. 231, 232-33 (1966). Religious freedom cases often interpret the 
concept of religion broadly to include humanistic inquiries-"an exploration of the nature 
of man, his diverse activities and interests, his quest for unity with something more than 
merely himself." Id. at 245. 
320 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 565-72 
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
321 Id. at 571. 
322 Id. at 566 n.9. 
323 Janice C. Biskin, The Hyde Amendment: An Infringement Upon the Free Exercise 
Clause?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1054, 1064 n.69 (1981). See, McRae v. Califano, 491 
F.Supp. 630, 692-702 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (containing a comprehensive overview of the 
testimony of various theologians regarding religious doctrine pertaining to the abortion 
decision). The conservative and reformed teachings of Jewish Law emphasize the 
"primacy of the duty to protect existing life and health, coupled with a belief that life 
does not begin until live birth .... [A]bortion is mandated if there is a danger to the 
mother's health. Biskin, supra, at 1064 n.69. In McRae, one rabbi testified: "The 
decision to have an abortion is as much a part of the exercise of the Jewish Religion as 
the observance of ritual." Id. 
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conscience guarantee. 324 
V. Conclusion 
State constitutions represent the last, best hope for restoring 
the level of reproductive autonomy that formerly existed under the 
Federal Constitution. 325 Judicial reaction to state constitutional 
theories will vary from state to state. In some jurisdictions, the status 
quo will weigh heavily against any florescence of state constitutional 
jurisprudence. But necessity is the mother of invention and, in the 
wake of Casey. state constitutions represent the most promising tool 
at hand. 
More important, even the most skeptical jurist must admit that 
principles of federalism preclude any notion that state constitutions 
lack independent force. Each charter has its own unique text and its 
own unique history; this much cannot be ignored. Nor can the 
burgeoning development of state constitutions in many jurisdictions 
be ignored. 326 Finally. some judges may be pleasantly surprised to 
learn that constitutional interpretation is not the sole province of the 
U.S. Supreme Court-that, for them, it need not be a spectator sport. 
More precisely, state court judges need to be reminded that they have 
the power and the duty to perform an independent interpretation of 
their state charters. 
324 But see Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1992) (rejecting state 
equal protection, freedom-of-religion, and establishment-of-religion claims in a challenge 
to abortion access restrictions). 
325 Though many put their faith in the Federal Freedom of Choice Act, S.25, d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), which is currently wending its way through Congress, serious 
questions persist as to whether the federal legislature has the power under Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, to enact such a law. The only conceivable source of this 
power is the Federal Commerce Clause and, despite its nearly boundless elasticity, 
reliance on this clause may not withstand judicial scrutiny. See generally Ira C. Lupu, 
Statutes Revolving Jn Constitutional Law Orbits, VA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1993) (discussing 
the validity of substantive statutory schemes, such as the Freedom of Choice Act, that 
attempt to legislate constitutional nonns). See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 
S.Ct. 2408 (1992) (striking down portions of a federal statute that effectively coerced, 
rather than encouraged, state legislatures to adopt a particular regulatory scheme 
concerning low-level radioactive waste). 
326 See supra notes 42-72 and accompanying text. 
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These factors-federalism, the unique text and history of state 
constitutions, the burgeoning renaissance in many states, and the 
historic role of state courts in construing their own constitutions-may 
inspire a willingness, even among the most doubtful jurists, to take 
a second look at their own state charters. 
Just as the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights prompted this 
renaissance in the first place,327 so may the erosion of reproductive 
rights trigger an upsurge in state constitutional claims. It is my hope 
that this article will provide a road map for those who would invoke 
their state charters in the fight for reproductive freedom. 
327 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. 
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